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I. INTRODUCTION
The intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED"), also
known as the tort of outrage, is a relatively new cause of action, first
appearing in the legal academic literature during the 1930s.1 Since
that time, IIED has gained widespread acceptance and is now
1. The two seminal articles hastening development in this area of the law are Calvert
Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARv. L. REV. 1033 (1936),
and William L. Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REV.
874 (1939).
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recognized in all U.S. jurisdictions, 2 with most courts invoking the
definition set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts.3 Despite this
general acceptance of the tort, courts routinely assert that IIED is a
disfavored cause of action.4 Courts appear wary of holding defendants
liable for plaintiffs' emotional injuries and therefore seek to discourage
such claims.
In their efforts to cabin the application of IIED while
preserving it as a valid cause of action, the Restatement authors and
the courts have created a confused tort that means entirely different
things to different judges and thus serves disparate functions in the
courts of various states. In a minority of jurisdictions, courts express
disfavor by limiting IIED claims to instances of outrageous and
blatantly wrongful conduct for which the plaintiff has no other viable
theory of redress. For example, if a defendant's conduct can support a
defamation claim, these courts will not allow the plaintiff to maintain
an IIED claim for the same conduct.5 In effect, these courts define
IIED such that it never overlaps with any other tort. Recent
formulations of this position characterize IIED as a "gap-filler," or a
"residual" tort. 6
2. A recent draft revision to the Restatement of Torts lists cases from all fifty states plus
D.C. and the Virgin Islands. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND
EMOTIONAL HARM 22-23 (Council Draft No. 6, 2006).
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965). The basic elements are: (1) extreme and
outrageous conduct that (2) intentionally or recklessly (3) causes severe emotional distress. The
draft revision Third Restatement finds that forty-five jurisdictions, including D.C. and the Virgin
Islands, expressly follow § 46, while three states (Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee) follow a
modified version, two states (Hawaii and Wisconsin) follow an earlier version, and two states
(Mississippi and Montana) reject the Restatement approach altogether.
4. E.g., Denny v. Elizabeth Arden Salons, 456 F.3d 427, 436 (4th Cir. 2006) ("[IIED] is 'not
favored' under Virginia law." (quoting Ruth v. Fletcher, 377 S.E.2d 412, 415 (Va. 1989)));
Williams v. City of Mount Vernon, 428 F. Supp. 2d 146, 160 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) ("Claims for
intentional infliction of emotional distress are 'highly disfavored'.. . under New York law."
(quoting Torres v. Village of Sleepy Hollow, 379 F. Supp. 2d 478, 482 (2005))); Hill v. McHenry,
211 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1284 (D. Kan. 2002) ("The tort of outrage ... 'is not a favored cause of
action under Kansas law.' " (quoting Gillum v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Topeka, 970 F. Supp.
843, 854 (D. Kan. 1997))); Thomas v. BSE Indus. Contractors, 624 So. 2d 1041, 1044 (Ala. 1993)
("[Under Alabama law,] the tort of outrage is a very limited cause of action that is available only
in the most egregious circumstances."); McQuay v. Guntharp, 963 S.W.2d 583, 585 (Ark. 1998)
("[The Supreme Court of Arkansas] gives a narrow view to the tort of outrage ....").
5. See, e.g., Slue v. N.Y. Univ. Med. Ctr., 409 F. Supp. 2d 349, 371 n.16 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)
("[P]laintiff must allege extreme conduct that is not already an independent tort."); Moser v.
Roberts, 185 S.W.3d 912, 916 (Tex. App. 2006) ("Because the plaintiffs claims for slander, libel,
and malicious prosecution afforded her a remedy for any resulting emotional distress ... the tort
of IIED was not available to her based on the facts supporting those causes of action.").
6. See Slue, 409 F. Supp. 2d at 371 n.16 ("Intentional infliction of emotional distress is a
residual tort .. "); Moser, 185 S.W.3d at 915 ("Mhe tort of IIED is first and foremost a 'gap
filler .... ).
984
PROBLEMATIC TORT OF IIED
Most courts reject this limitation and accord IIED full status as
an independent tort. They allow an IIED claim to coexist with other
claims that arise from identical acts of a defendant. 7 This overlap can
extend both to common law claims such as assault, battery, false
imprisonment, defamation, and conversion, and to statutory claims
such as violations of antidiscrimination laws.8 In many of these cases,
IIED in effect becomes an aggravated version of one or more other
torts,9  and the courts' evaluation of an IIED claim can be
indistinguishable from the determination of whether to assess
punitive damages. 10
In many situations, the minority and majority approaches will
tend toward identical results because a plaintiff can recover
compensatory damages only once, regardless of how many theories
apply. Where the plaintiff prevails on another theory and receives
compensation for her psychological harm, the IIED claim is
superfluous, and it makes no difference whether the court considers
IIED to be an independent cause of action. However, in some
situations, the viability of an IIED claim has important ramifications
for the litigation. Depending on the limitations that apply to the
alternative cause of action, the availability of IED can determine the
maximum damages allowable, the range of losses or injuries that can
be compensated, and even the potential for any legal recourse at all.
To explain the conflicting IIED jurisprudence, Part II of this
Note traces the emergence and evolution of IIED in the American
legal system. What began as an assortment of anomalous cases in
which courts broke the traditional rule against compensating purely
emotional injuries gained the recognition of prominent scholars, who
then announced the arrival of "a new tort."'" To narrow the impact of
this act of scholarly creativity, IIED's proponents imposed strict
limitations on the tort, particularly on the signature injury, which
7. E.g., Kant v. Altayar, 704 N.W.2d 537, 540 (Neb. 2005) ("The same wrongful conduct
may support a civil action based on a theory of battery as well as an action based upon the
independent tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.").
8. See, e.g., Littlefield v. McGuffey, 954 F.2d 1337, 1342-43 (7th Cir. 1992) (allowing
plaintiff to recover under both the federal Fair Housing Act and Illinois common law IIED for the
same course of conduct); Stockett v. Tolin, 791 F. Supp. 1536, 1552-56 (S.D. Fla. 1992)
(sustaining IIED claim in addition to claims of battery, invasion of privacy, false imprisonment,
and sexual harassment).
9. E.g., Stockett, 791 F. Supp at 1556 ("An ordinary prudent person, viewing [defendant's]
cumulative behavior, would be compelled to find this outrageous. The sum total of [his] conduct
therefore also constituted an intentional infliction of emotional distress." (emphasis added)).
10. See, e.g., Littlefield, 954 F.2d at 1347-50 (stating that, for awarding damages for IIED,
the court disallows punitive damages because the same standard exists under Illinois common
law, so granting both IIED and punitive damages would result in duplicative recovery).
11. Prosser, supra note 1.
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they defined as severe emotional distress. In practice, this limitation
distorts the common law antecedents of IIED and artificially restricts
this intentional (i.e., conduct-based) tort. Many courts have followed
suit and sought to narrow the application of IIED. Part II concludes
with a discussion of the narrowest view: that IIED is a "gap-filler"
available only when the injury is severe and no other theory of redress
is available.
Part III explores the position of IIED in the analytical
framework of tort law. Section III.A discusses several practical and
theoretical problems that account for the judicial impulse to curtail
the availability of IIED to plaintiffs. Most of the problems derive from
the nature of the injury, emotional distress, in being both intangible
and common, if not ubiquitous, in society. Section III.B discusses the
implications of the general doctrinal restriction against providing
compensation for emotional harm-a restriction to which IIED is an
apparent exception. In general, American tort law does not
compensate injuries in the absence of a violation of a recognized
interest-a wrong-that is causally prior to the emotional harm. This
observation suggests that, to remain consistent with the rest of tort
law, IIED must protect such an interest: specifically, an interest in
freedom from extreme and outrageous emotional attack. Thus, a
violation of this interest makes the resultant emotional harm
compensable in damages. Section III.C discusses the significance of
recognizing IIED as a cause of action-in identifying a protected
interest in freedom from emotional attack. Understanding IIED in
this way is inconsistent with the view that it is a gap-filler: by making
one protected interest conditional on others, the gap-filler approach
has the counterintuitive effect of creating gaps between IIED and
other torts.
Section III.D analyzes the relationship between IIED and
punitive damages. Even under the existing definition of IIED,
requiring both outrageous conduct and severe injury, courts inevitably
focus on the outrageous conduct element. This focus is natural
considering that the injury is common and difficult to assess. Because
the standards for IIED and punitive damages are expressed
similarly-in terms of outrageousness or reprehensibility-some
courts and other observers have found them to be redundant or
interchangeable, which leads to the conclusion that IED is merely a
peculiar form of punitive damages. While a singular emphasis on the
reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct concededly blurs the line
between IIED and punitive damages, the apparent redundancy is
illusory. IIED is a doctrine of compensatory liability that remains
986 [Vol. 61:3:983
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distinct from punitive damages despite the similarity in their
standards.
Part IV argues that reformulating IIED as a purely intentional
tort will resolve much of the doctrinal confusion and judicial
inconsistency discussed in this Note. This section advocates removing
the severe injury requirement from the prima facie case and replacing
it with an objective test of injury like that used for assault. This
change would focus judicial attention on the nature of the defendant's
conduct and its sufficiency to cause severe emotional distress,
eliminating the threshold inquiry into the severity of the harm caused
to the plaintiff. This Note concludes with a corollary proposal to
rename the reformulated tort "harassment"-a name that clearly
designates the proscribed conduct, gives notice to potential
defendants, and clarifies the nature of the interest that the IIED tort
protects. This proposal is not intended to expand the scope of liability
under IIED as currently applied, but instead to "restate" the existing
tradition in an analytically sound form that should result in more
consistent application of the tort.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Adding Injury to Insult: The Invention of IIED
Throughout most of the history of Anglo-American tort law,
courts did not treat the infliction of emotional distress as an
independent cause of action. Recovery for such an injury generally was
unavailable unless the plaintiffs psychological harm had arisen from
a prior, "predicate" injury-an injury that itself was recoverable under
an established tort. In the late 1800s and early 1900s, courts
increasingly awarded damages for emotional distress unaccompanied
by another actionable injury. Some of these courts attempted to
conceal the doctrinal irregularity by citing an established tort, such as
assault, as the nominal cause of action. 12 Observing this trend, several
12. See, e.g., Interstate Life & Accident Co. v. Brewer, 193 S.E. 458, 463 (Ga. Ct. App. 1937)
(holding that an insurance adjuster who berated a sick woman in a hospital and insultingly
tossed a coin on her bed was liable for emotional distress damages as a result of the physical
injury caused by the coin); Johnson v. Hahn, 150 N.W. 6, 6 (Iowa 1914) (referring to indecent
proposal as an assault); Adams v. Rivers, 11 Barb. 390 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1851) (holding that
verbal insults delivered from the sidewalk in front of plaintiffs house supported an action for
trespass); Leach v. Leach, 33 S.W. 703, 703 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895) (allowing recovery for assault
where an indecent proposal was considered "an outrage to her feelings"); see also William L.
Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CAL. L. REV. 40, 43 (1956) (commenting that, in such cases, the
nominal tort merely "served as a peg upon which to hang the mental damages").
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commentators from the legal academy published articles that
advocated enhancing the status of emotional distress to a cognizable
predicate injury. 13 Nevertheless, the original Restatement of Torts,
published in 1934, explicitly denied liability for any claim based solely
on emotional or psychological harm, even when the emotional harm
caused additional, physical injuries.
14
In response to the Restatement position, a series of influential
articles published over the next five years argued for recognition of
IIED, 15 with William Prosser announcing its arrival as "a new tort."
16
Evidently persuaded, the American Law Institute ("ALI") rewrote § 46
in a 1948 supplement to the Restatement, reversing its earlier
position. This first "official" formulation of the tort of IIED assessed
liability to "[o]ne who, without a privilege to do so, intentionally
causes severe emotional distress to another ... "17
Courts and commentators consistently have observed that
emotional distress is common, and the vast majority of it, even when
inflicted intentionally, cannot be a basis for tort liability. In Prosser's
original article, he took pains to exclude "trivialities and mere bad
manners" from liability, noting that "[i]f the plaintiff is to recover
every time that her feelings are hurt, we should all be in court twice a
week."18 To account for this danger, he qualified his proposed
definition of the new tort as "the intentional, outrageous infliction of
mental suffering in an extreme form."'19 The inclusion of outrage as a
defining term has remained inextricably linked with IIED ever since-
even to the point of usurping the name.
As the ALI's Reporter for the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
Professor Prosser continued his husbandry of IIED and added
13. Francis H. Bohlen, Right to Recover for Injury Resulting from Negligence Without
Impact, in STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS 252, 252 (1926); Herbert F. Goodrich, Emotional
Disturbance as Legal Damage, 20 MICH. L. REV. 497 (1922); Archibald H. Throckmorton,
Damages for Fright, 34 HARV. L. REV. 260 (1921).
14. "[C]onduct which is intended or... likely to cause only a mental or emotional
disturbance to another does not subject the actor to liability (a) for emotional distress resulting
therefrom or (b) for bodily injury unexpectably [sic] resulting from such disturbance."
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 46 (1934) (emphasis added).
15. Fowler V. Harper & Mary Coate McNeely, A Re-examination of the Basis for Liability
for Emotional Distress, 1938 WIS. L. REV. 426 (1938); Magruder, supra note 1; Prosser, supra
note 1; Lawrence Vold, Tort Recovery for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 18 NEB. L.
BULL. 222, 222 (1939).
16. Prosser, supra note 1, at 874.
17. See Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 136, 142-43 (1992) (quoting
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 46 (Supp. 1948)).
18. Prosser, supra note 1, at 877.
19. Id. at 874 (emphasis added). Thus, the two potentially divergent concepts of
outrageousness and psychological attack have been tied together in IIED from the start.
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"extreme and outrageous conduct" as a necessary element of the prima
facie case. 20  The commentary elaborates on the meaning of
outrageousness by explaining that it "does not extend to mere insults,
indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other
trivialities."21 While this list of excluded trivialities reinforces the
requirement of extremity, it provides little guidance to either courts or
potential defendants as to the forms of conduct that produce liability.
To amplify the definitional confusion, many of the cases cited
in the influential articles on tort recovery for emotional distress
actually fit neatly within the listed exceptions. In other words, the
early common law exemplars of IED were in fact insults, indignities
and threats-although the Restatement (Second) disclaimed them and
modern courts have followed suit. Passengers insulted by railway and
ship employees were the first large class of successful plaintiffs.22
Courts recognized these claims early enough that the original
Restatement, alongside its general denial of liability for mere
emotional distress, added a special exception for insults to
passengers. 23 Courts initially split on the characterization of these
claims as sounding in contract or tort,24 with the tort theory based on
a special duty of carriers toward their passengers. 25 In many of the
reported cases, liability attached to verbal attacks that clearly rose to
the level of insult, but not beyond.26 Some courts went so far as to
20. Prosser, supra note 12, at 43. With Prosser serving as its Reporter, the ALI
incorporated this language into the Second Restatement version of IIED that controls the
discussion through the present day.
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965).
22. E.g., Chamberlain v. Chandler, 5 Fed. Cas. 413, 413-14 (No. 2575) (C.C.D. Mass. 1823);
Gillespie v. Brooklyn Heights R.R. Co., 70 N.E. 857, 858-63 (N.Y. 1904); Lipman v. Atl. Coast
Line R.R. Co., 93 S.E. 714, 714-16 (S.C. 1917); Lamson v. Great N. Ry. Co., 130 N.W. 945, 945-46
(Wis. 1911). The first Restatement acknowledged the liability of common carriers for their
passengers' emotional distress as a special exception to the general rule denying liability.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 48 (1934).
23. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 48 cmt. e.
24. The decision in the original passenger-insult case was based on the theory that the
carrier had contracted for "decency of demeanor" in addition to transportation. Chamberlain, 5
Fed. Cas. at 413-14; cf. Bleecker v. Colorado & So. Ry. Co., 114 P. 481, 484 (Colo. 1911) (same);
Frewen v. Page, 131 N.E. 475, 475 (Mass. 1921) (same); Knoxville Traction Co. v. Lane, 53 S.W.
557, 558-60 (Tenn. 1899) (use of contract as a basis for insult liability).
25. This included prospective passengers-who therefore had no contractual basis for their
claims. E.g., Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Jones, 39 S.W. 124, 124-25 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897). The
evolution of "carrier cases" is discussed in detail in John W. Wade, Tort Liability for Abusive and
Insulting Language, 4 VAND. L. REV. 63, 66-71 (1950).
26. See Southern Ry. Co. v. Carroll, 70 So. 984, 984 (Ala. Ct. App. 1915) ("rascal" and
"person in need"); Bleecker v. Colo. & So. Ry. Co., 114 P. 481, 481 (Colo. 1911) ("damn little cur");
Cole v. Atlanta & W. Point R.R. Co., 31 S.E. 107, 108 (Ga. 1897) ("dead-beat"); Gillespie v.
Brooklyn Heights R.R. Co., 70 N.E. 857, 858 (N.Y. 1904) ("swindler"); Huffman v. S. Ry. Co., 79
S.E. 307, 308 (N.C. 1913) ("cheap skate").
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impose liability for the mere use of profane language in the presence
of a genteel plaintiff.27 Common carrier liability for verbal affronts
subsequently expanded into other public contexts, including hotels,
theaters, telegraph offices and elevators, and has been captioned the
"Special Liability of Public Utility for Insults by Servants. '28
While courts acknowledged that the common carrier and public
utility insult cases constituted a special exception to the no-liability
rule,29 many contemporaneous cases recognized pure emotional
distress as a valid injury and found liability for insults and indignities
suffered far from any' public utility. Several such cases involved
defendants who shouted obscenities at people in their homes, even
when the defendant made no direct contact with either the plaintiff or
his property.30 In the late 1800s, some courts allowed women who
received unwanted propositions to recover for the indignity .or insult to
their virtue-generally under a nominal, but defective claim of
assault.31 Although the common law precedents cited by Prosser and
his colleagues in the academic literature were replete with examples
of liability imposed for emotionally distressing insults, the
Restatement has always excluded such cases from the scope of IIED.
One of the most prominent lines of cases in the evolution of
IIED arose from the development of the modern credit and insurance
industries. Specifically, the pressure tactics of humiliating debtors
into repayment and intimidating claimants into accepting low
compensation for insured losses became a fertile source of abusive
27. See, e.g., Birmingham Ry. Light & Power Co. v. Glenn, 60 So. 111, 112 (Ala. 1912);
Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Bell, 179 S.W. 400, 400-01 (Ky. 1915); Fort Worth & Rio
Grande Ry. Co. v. Bryant, 210 S.W. 556, 556 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918); St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co. of Tex.
v. Wright, 84 S.W. 270, 270-71 (Tex. Civ. App. 1904) ("[S]he was a girl of about 18 years of age,
was the only lady in the coach, and by reason of the vulgar and indecent language she was
greatly alarmed and frightened, and her sense of modesty was shocked ... .
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 48 (1965).
29. Their exceptional status is emphasized by their continued separate treatment in
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 48.
30. See, e.g., Voss v. Bolzenius, 128 S.W. 1, 1 (Mo. Ct. App. 1910) (holding defendant liable
for calling plaintiff offensive names while driving past his house); Adams v. Rivers, 11 Barb. 390
(N.Y. Gen. Term 1851) (holding that verbal insults delivered from the sidewalk in front of
plaintiffs house supported an action for "trespass"); Matheson v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 135 S.E.
306, 307 (S.C. 1926). A larger number of cases found liability where the defendant insulted or
otherwise affronted the plaintiff and also entered the plaintiffs property. See, e.g., Kurpgeweit v.
Kirby, 129 N.W. 177, 178 (Neb. 1910) (neighbor deceived woman and questioned her moral
character); Buchanan v. W. Union Tel. Co., 106 S.E. 159, 159 (S.C. 1920) (courier propositioned
plaintiff at her home); Levine v. Trammell, 41 S.W.2d 334, 334-35 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) (landlord
verbally abused tenant during eviction).
31. See, e.g., Johnson v. Hahn, 150 N.W. 6, 6 (Iowa 1914) (indecent proposal); Leach v.
Leach, 33 S.W. 703, 703 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895) ("intent to have carnal knowledge" of a married
woman); Craker v. Chi. & N.W. Ry., 36 Wis. 657 (1875) (unwanted kiss).
990 [Vol. 61:3:983
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behavior that had no home in the community of recognized torts. Some
collection cases involved conduct readily assignable to established tort
categories like defamation and assault, but in others the courts either
lacked these options or chose to identify the infliction of emotional
distress as the predicate for recovery. 32 It has been suggested that the
courts in these cases were especially willing to compensate plaintiffs
for purely emotional injuries because the abusive treatment was a
deliberate and premeditated element of a commercial strategy.33 The
claims adjustment cases presented courts with the compelling
scenario of a powerful insurance company bullying a physically infirm
and/or financially vulnerable victim. 34 In recent years, the existence of
a special relationship, particularly one of authority or economic
dependence, between the plaintiff and defendant often has been an
important factor in rendering liability for IIED.
35
Rarer in the case law, but equally emblematic of what became
IIED, were practical jokes that caused the victim to suffer a nervous
breakdown. In the famous "pot of gold" case, Nickerson v. Hodges, an
eccentric woman with a history of mental instability believed that
dead relatives had buried a treasure on a neighbor's property and she
made a project of digging for it.36 The defendants planted a false
treasure, a closed pot filled with "rocks and wet dirt," with
instructions to open the pot in the presence of all the heirs. A crowd
gathered for the unveiling, and when the woman revealed the pot's
contents, she was thoroughly humiliated. She suffered a mental
breakdown and never recovered, dying two years later, still convinced
that she had been robbed of her family's gold. The Louisiana Supreme
Court held that, despite the defendants' lack of intent to cause such
grievous harm to the victim, the defendants were liable for her
injuries. Without invoking any named cause of action, the court
32. See, e.g., Clark v. Associated Retail Credit Men, 105 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1939); Barnett v.
Collection Serv. Co., 242 N.W. 25, 28 (Iowa 1932) (granting recovery for mental anguish resulting
from intentional conduct absent physical harm); La Salle Extension Univ. v. Fogarty, 253 N.W.
424, 424-26 (Neb. 1934).
33. Wade, supra note 25, at 72.
34. Saks & Sons v. Ivey, 157 So. 265, 265-66 (Ala. Ct. App. 1934); Continental Cas. Co. v.
Garrett, 161 So. 753, 754-55 (Miss. 1935); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Tetirick, 89 P.2d 774, 775-76
(Okla. 1938).
35. "The extreme and outrageous character of the conduct may arise from an abuse by the
actor of a position, or a relation with the other, which gives him actual or apparent authority
over the other, or power to affect his interests." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. e
(1965). Another important antecedent to authority-based IIED claims is Johnson v. Sampson, in
which a high school principal threatened a girl with various legal consequences to secure her
confession of promiscuous behavior, 208 N.W. 814, 815-16 (Minn. 1926).
36. For relevant facts of the case, see 84 So. 37, 37-39 (La. 1920).
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awarded damages to her estate. As in the claims adjustment cases, the
plaintiffs known vulnerability factored in the finding of liability.
37
The contemporary application of IIED draws on these disparate
common law traditions of assigning liability for extreme insults and
threats, abusive commercial practices, and the exploitation of
authority, special relationships, and peculiar vulnerabilities, where
the principal impact is psychological. Although courts have discarded
insult from the mix, sexual voyeurism and degradation have risen to
fill this vacancy. Faced with facts ranging from surreptitious candid
photography to coerced self-exploration, courts have shown a recent
willingness to protect this sphere of the psyche from invasive
misconduct.38 This has been a selective enterprise, as the courts have
left other avenues to emotional distress free from judicial intervention.
In particular, romantic interference (once covered by the now-defunct
"amatory" torts) and litigation are firmly outside the realm of IIED
liability. Nevertheless, courts sometimes find liability in areas
considered privileged. No matter the context, an outrageous set of
facts or severe injury can suffice for liability. The appearance of being
a judicial grab bag, a miscellaneous assortment of examples lacking
any consistent principle, has contributed to the perception of IIED as
an all-purpose tool that courts can reserve for special occasions,
granting or denying claims with only their own sense of outrage to
guide them. 39
37. "The extreme and outrageous character of the conduct may arise from the actor's
knowledge that the other is peculiarly susceptible to emotional distress, by reason of some
physical or mental condition or peculiarity." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. f.
Prosser describes an unreported case in which a landlady had a grudge against a tenant who she
knew had an abnormally weak heart. She confronted him over a disagreement, hurling verbal
abuse at him until he suddenly died of a heart attack. Although the case was settled prior to
court proceedings, the likely result was obvious. Prosser, supra note 12, at 50.
38. E.g., Am. Guarantee & Liab. Co. v. 1906 Co., 273 F.3d 605, 612-14 (5th Cir. 2001)
(holding that, under Mississippi law, photography studio was liable to models for distress caused
by employee's use of a hidden video camera in the dressing room); Jackson v. Carlos
Supermarket, LLC, No. CV000599734, 2002 WL 378317, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 14, 2002)
(holding that grocery store employee who coerced shoplifter into fondling herself to avoid arrest
was liable for IED); Coates v. Wal-Mart Stores, 976 P.2d 999, 1002-03, 1009 (N.M. 1999)
(finding IED liability for supervisor's numerous incidents of "lewd and vulgar suggestions,"
breast-groping, and other sexual harassment of subordinates).
39. Daniel Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the Limits of
Evenhandedness: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82 COLUM.
L. REV. 42, 74-75 (1982).
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B. A Hybrid Tort: Severe Injury and Extreme Conduct as
Required Elements
The Restatement classifies IIED as an intentional tort, along
with assault and battery. However, unlike other intentional torts, it is
predicated on the causation of objective harm to the plaintiff. In this
feature, IIED resembles negligence. The common law antecedents
discussed above both reflect and contradict this dual nature. On one
hand, they fit within IIED precisely because each is founded on the
intentional causation of an emotional injury. On the other hand, most
of the cases emphasize outrage at the defendant's conduct above the
severity of the injury-even where the severity of the injury is
primarily what makes the conduct seem outrageous.
40
The "restating" of this emerging body of common law did more
than simply recapitulate the observed trend: it transformed it. In the
process of defining the "new tort," ALI Reporter Prosser and his
colleagues selectively decided which of the precedent cases would
qualify. Their selectivity was problematic because, as in any unsettled
area, the cases conflicted with one another. For most of the cited cases
supporting liability, one could find a similar case opposing it. Thus,
while boldly announcing the discovery of an emerging tort protecting
an interest in emotional tranquility, Prosser and his colleagues
tailored their definitions to address the objections they anticipated,
limiting the new tort to the most extreme examples. 41 As discussed in
Part III, IIED is controversial in part because it potentially imposes
liability for a lot of ordinary behavior. For such an invasive doctrine to
survive, it needed strong limitations. To this end, the Restatement
definition places high bars on both the injury and conduct elements,
consciously limiting the tort to doubly exceptional cases. These
restrictions have resulted in the schizophrenic interpretation of IIED
as being primarily injury-based or conduct-based.
One of the paradigmatic IIED cases illustrates the decisive role
that the injury requirement can play in a court's analysis. In
Wilkinson v. Downton, a prankster persuaded a woman that her
husband had been injured in an accident and was hospitalized with
two broken legs.42 Upon hearing the news, the woman went into a
40. For example, the "pot of gold" case discussed in Section ILA, see supra text
accompanying note 36, would probably be viewed as a very clever and elaborate practical joke if
it had not also destroyed the life of an evidently vulnerable woman. With the benefit of
hindsight, the element of cruelty predominates over the jokers' creativity and craftsmanship.
41. 'The law intervenes only where the distress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable
man could be expected to endure it." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j.
42. [18971 2 Q.B. 57, 57.
2008] 993
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
state of nervous shock, "producing vomiting and other more serious
and permanent physical consequences. "'43 The prank may have been
thoughtless or unkind, but it was only the woman's exaggerated
reaction that made the episode notorious enough for the court to hold
the defendant liable. Without a severe injury, it would be hard to
categorize the Wilkinson prank as either extreme or outrageous, let
alone both.
As to precisely which types of conduct should meet the § 46
criteria, courts are mostly left to their own devices. The widely cited
commentary supplements the definition as conduct "so outrageous in
character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible
bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly
intolerable in a civilized community."44 Framed in this way, the
threshold of liability under IED is nothing other than the degrees of
opprobrium and hyperbole that the defendant's behavior inspires.
Nevertheless, courts routinely hear cases of indecent and intolerable
behavior and reject the resulting IED claims.
The Restatement commentary effectively concedes the
impossibility of precise definition, summarizing the valid IED claim
in terms that are both amusingly quaint and absurdly vague:
"Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an
average member of the community would arouse his resentment
against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, 'Outrageous!' "45 One
scholar referred to this as "a standard in search of a context ... the
hermit crab of the law of torts."46 The definition also may be
understood as a yardstick in search of a ruler-just as deciding what
"huge" means requires that we know the relationship of normal to big,
"outrageous" derives its meaning from the proportional relationship
between normal and bad. Courts apply this conclusory language
broadly, sometimes relying on the inference that ordinary bad
behavior, by definition, could not be considered both extreme and
outrageous .47
Unlike the more established intentional torts, outrageous
conduct has no clear definitional verb. Of course, the operative verb in
"intentional infliction" is inflict, but this is little more than to cause
43. Id. at 58.
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d.
45. Id. This portion of the commentary first appeared in the 1948 Supplement. Taking this
statement literally, the gauge of liability resides entirely in the beholder, and its application in
the present day depends on the use of a word that has lost most of its currency.
46. Givelber, supra note 39, at 69.
47. E.g., Lowe v. Philip Morris USA, 142 P.3d 1079, 1092 (Or. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that
IED requires violation of a duty beyond that of ordinary care).
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pain or injury,48 which in turn is indistinguishable from generic
tortiousness. The only feature specific to IIED is the nature of the
injury-emotional distress, mental suffering, psychological pain, etc.-
itself notoriously difficult to define, verify, or quantify. Because IIED
requires a severe emotional injury, there is a risk that an essentially
quantitative measure of the injury may substitute for qualitative
guidance as to the conduct.
For potential tortfeasors, this definitional ambiguity raises the
problem of the "eggshell" victim: if outrageous conduct is indefinable
except by the magnitude of its effect, then another person's emotional
fragility can be the essential determinant of liability.49 Contingency on
injury is consistent with negligence but exceptional among the
intentional torts. This is one of the doctrinal inconsistencies that this
Note addresses in Part IV by proposing to eliminate injury as a formal
element of IIED.
The Restatement implies that severity of injury can substitute
for extremity of conduct and vice-versa. Whereas the formal definition
of IIED includes causation of severe emotional distress as an element,
and courts routinely dismiss claims for failing to show the requisite
severity, the official comments provide that "in many cases the
extreme and outrageous character of the conduct" will satisfy most, if
not all, of this burden. 50 Conversely, as discussed above, in some
widely cited IIED cases with eggshell victims, it is precisely the
severity of the emotional distress renders the conduct extreme and
outrageous. 51 Requiring a severe injury as an offset for less outrageous
conduct, or more outrageous conduct when the injury is unproven,
furthers the perception that IIED is an unprincipled doctrine. 52 The
apparent sliding scale of outrage leads to the question of whether
IIED truly contains two independent elements, or instead effectively
merges conduct and injury into a "totality of the facts" standard. The
48. A representative dictionary definition of inflict: "to cause (something damaging or
painful) to be endured." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1983).
49. Both the Wilkinson and Nickerson cases, discussed in the text accompanying supra
notes 42-43 and 36, respectively, illustrate the problem of the eggshell victim under IIED.
50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j (1965). At least one state, Mississippi, has
shown a willingness to omit the traditional inquiry into the severity of the emotional injury.
Funderburk v. Johnson, 935 So. 2d 1084, 1099 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001) ("In Mississippi, the
standard for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is very high, and focuses on
the defendant's conduct rather than on the plaintiffs emotional condition.").
51. Section 46 requires knowledge of the victim's vulnerability as a precondition to this
form of IIED liability-that is, where outrage is based on the injury alone. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. f.
52. See Givelber, supra note 39, at 75 ("[T]here is little evidence that [IIED] will ever
provide the basis for principled adjudication .... ").
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Restatement's guidance can be interpreted either way, leaving the door
open to broad judicial interpretation of IIED.
C. The Tort of Last Resort
The inherently imprecise nature of "outrageousness"
encourages the widely held conclusion that IIED is a gap-filler
designed to capture behavior that a court finds troublesome, but which
slips through the cracks between the well-defined, traditional tort
categories. While the description of IIED as a gap-filler may be
historically accurate, as a tenet of legal doctrine it is problematic. As
discussed in detail in Part III, relegating IIED to secondary status
creates an incoherent account of which rights and interests the law
recognizes. Incoherence undermines the legitimacy of judicial
proceedings, sends mixed signals to society, and grants or denies
redress arbitrarily.
Courts disagree as to whether IIED constitutes an independent
tort. In the majority of U.S. jurisdictions, judicial opinions recognizing
IIED impute no limitation relative to other potentially applicable
torts.53 These courts entertain IIED claims for conduct that is
actionable under alternative theories of liability.54 The Restatement
implicitly agrees that IIED is an independent cause of action.5
5
However, in a significant minority of jurisdictions, courts relegate
IED to an inferior status, finding that it cannot overlap with other
torts or statutory wrongs. 56 There is a further problem of consistency
53. An incomplete list of jurisdictions that have unambiguously expressed the majority
position in recent decisions includes Alabama,- Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, the District of
Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, Ohio, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Virginia.
54. E.g., Kant v. Altayar, 270 Neb. 501, 505 (2005) ("The same wrongful conduct may
support a civil action based on a theory of battery as well as an action based upon the
independent tort of [IIED].").
55. Section 46 contains no restriction of IIED claims to conduct not covered by other
sections. The most recent draft revision for the upcoming Restatement (Third) goes further in
explicitly endorsing the permissibility of overlapping tort claims based on the same conduct.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM 7, 10-11
(Council Draft No. 6, 2006). The draft revision also lends support to a gap-filler interpretation,
however, noting that IIED "can readily be added whenever the real gravamen of the case is a
different tort," and approving "aggressive judicial policing of this tort." Id. at 13. The draft
revision does not explore the tension between these points of view-although its approval of
"aggressive judicial policing" can be read as rationalizing the gap-filler doctrine by justifying the
impulse to restrict overlapping claims without explicitly engaging the doctrinal argument.
56. An incomplete list of jurisdictions that have expressed the minority position, in at least
some recent reported opinions, includes Florida, see cases cited infra note 57; Kentucky, Messick
v. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc., 45 F. Supp. 2d 578, 582 (E.D. Ky. 1999) (holding that the
availability of alternative avenue of recovery for emotional distress invalidates an IIED claim);
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within jurisdictions; many states have some opinions dismissing IED
claims on the basis that other claims are available and other opinions
that permit IIED claims in cases where other theories of redress
certainly would apply.57 It is unclear whether these courts would rule
out all overlap, or whether the exclusion is particular to certain types
of claims.
58
In many situations, the classification of IIED as a gap-filler is
academic: as long as the court permits recovery of the emotional
distress damages, the label that courts attach to the theory of liability
is of little concern to the parties. Presumably, when IIED overlaps
with another tort, the other tort will have a lower standard of
"outrageousness" and lack a rigid severe injury requirement, so the
other claim will present an easier case to win. Courts and observers
have noted that the IIED standard is equal to or more stringent than
the standard for punitive damages, so any plaintiff seeking additional
recovery under IIED would be entitled to punitive damages under the
alternative cause of action.5 9 Thus, as long as the conduct clearly fits
into the other tort category and there is no incidental barrier to
Missouri, Rice v. Hodapp, 919 S.W.2d 240, 245 (Mo. 1996) ("A cause of action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress 'does not lie when the offending conduct consists only of a
defamation.'" (quoting Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 316 (Mo. 1993)); New
Hampshire, DeMeo v. Goodall, 640 F. Supp. 1115, 1116 (D.N.H. 1986); New York, Moore v. City
of New York, 219 F. Supp. 2d 335, 339 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) ("IIED is a theory of recovery that is to be
invoked only as a last resort, when traditional tort remedies are unavailable; accordingly, no
IED claim will lie where the conduct underlying the claim falls within the ambit of traditional
tort liability."); North Carolina, Dickens v. Puryear, 276 S.E.2d 325, 336-37 (N.C. 1981),
discussed in the text accompanying infra notes 60-62; and Texas; Moser v. Roberts, 185 S.W.3d
912, 915 (Tex. App. 2006) ("[IIED] is first and foremost a 'gap-filler' tort which was created for
the limited purpose of allowing recovery in those rare instances where a defendant inflicts severe
emotional distress in a manner so unusual that the victim has no other recognized theory of
redress.").
57. Florida provides an example of this inconsistency. Compare Stockett v. Tolin, 791 F.
Supp. 1536, 1560-61 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (holding the sum total of actionable battery, invasion of
privacy, and false imprisonment, combined with other behavior, provided the basis for a valid
IIED claim), with Trujillo v. Banco Cent. del Ecuador, 17 F. Supp. 2d 1340, 1344-45 (S.D. Fla.
1998) (holding that a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress could not be
maintained under Florida law where it was based on the same publication as was involved in a
dismissed defamation claim against the defendant). Other states with apparently inconsistent
recent decisions include California, Kentucky, Missouri, and South Dakota.
58. The judicial opinions examined in research for this Note suggest the latter
interpretation: that certain causes of action, such as defamation and alienation of affection, are
so closely related to IIED that any judicial or legislative determinations that apply to the other
causes of action should be taken as governing all claims for emotional distress that are
essentially similar-i.e., all claims that are essentially defamatory or amatory. This is an
attractive position, but it raises a conundrum: if sophisticated practitioners of IED want to
evade liability, they need only engage in behavior that approximates, say, defamation, but in a
way that gives rise to a defective claim.
59. See infra notes 116-117 and accompanying text.
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recovery under the other tort, the unavailability of IIED has no
practical significance to the parties.
In certain circumstances, however, the decision to permit an
IIED claim when another tort could apply will determine the
plaintiffs potential for recovery. This is most often the case when
differing statutes of limitations apply to the claims or when the
availability of punitive damages for the claims differs. In the dramatic
case of Dickens v. Puryear, an adult man had an intimate relationship
with the defendants' teenage daughter. 60 The defendants lured the
plaintiff to a remote location, where they captured him and subjected
him to a harrowing series of beatings and threats, including a credible
threat of castration. The encounter concluded with the plaintiffs
release and instructions that he must "go home, pull his telephone off
the wall, pack his clothes, and leave the state of North Carolina;
otherwise he would be killed."
The plaintiff filed suit more than a year later, after the statutes
of limitations for assault, battery and false imprisonment had elapsed,
but within the three-year period allowed for IIED; so he attempted to
classify the entire episode as "extreme and outrageous." The lower
courts ruled that all of the defendants' conduct fell within the realm of
assault and battery, which preempted the IIED claim. 61 On appeal,
the North Carolina Supreme Court agreed that the majority of the
conduct sounded in assault or battery and therefore was barred;
however, it also found that the defendants' parting threat, conditional
on future compliance with their demands, could not properly be
considered assault.62 Finding that this threat alone, in context of the
evening's events, was sufficient to cause the plaintiffs subsequent
emotional distress, the high court allowed the IIED claim to proceed,
but only on this narrow portion of the abuse. The plaintiff could
recover for his fear of future ambush, but North Carolina's strict gap-
filler doctrine precluded recovery for the pain and suffering that he
had endured while in the defendants' captivity.
The characterization of IIED as a gap-filler can be fatal to the
plaintiffs case when any available alternative claims prove to be
defective. In Rockhill v. Pollard, the plaintiff was in a car accident and
sought medical treatment for herself and her infant daughter shortly
afterward. 63 Although the baby was unresponsive and appeared
60. For relevant facts of this case, see 276 S.E.2d 325, 327-28, 336 (N.C. 1981).
61. Id. at 328. The omission of false imprisonment is inexplicable.
62. Id. at 336. The prima facie case for assault requires that the threat of harmful contact
be imminent. When, as in this case, the threat is conditional, this threshold is not met. Thus, the
court held that this threat did not sound in assault. Id.
63. For relevant facts of this case, see 485 P.2d 28, 29-33 (Or. 1971).
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lifeless, the doctor gave only a cursory examination, not noticing a
fracture of the baby's skull that required immediate treatment. Rather
than provide medical attention, he declared their injuries to be
insignificant, berated the plaintiff for disturbing him, and ordered the
pair back outside in wet clothing on a freezing night, with no means of
transportation. Several hours later, a hospital in another town treated
the pair-the mother required stitches for her wounds and the baby
was hospitalized for a week. The plaintiff suffered from insomnia and
loss of appetite and received treatment for nervous exhaustion for two
years afterward. The action could have been in medical malpractice,
although it probably was deficient due to the lack of a cognizable
injury as they were treated elsewhere the same day. Nevertheless, the
Oregon Supreme Court found that her IIED claim could proceed,
reversing a lower court's dismissal. If Oregon's IIED doctrine had been
the same as North Carolina's, her case would have had to succeed or
fail under medical malpractice alone. 64
In a case of this nature-where a strong IIED claim overlaps
with a more questionable alternative claim-the gap-filler doctrine
dramatically affects the parties. A plaintiff in this situation may or
may not be permitted to re-litigate the IIED claim. This question itself
may require an appeal, which would add to the uncertainty of the
outcome. Even if ultimately permitted to proceed with the IIED claim,
the plaintiff would have wasted considerable time and effort on the
defective claim-not to mention both the defendant's and the court's
time and effort concerning the matter. There is a strong possibility
that barring the IIED claim in the first instance prevents all but the
most dedicated plaintiff from ever bringing the claim. Even if an
exceptional plaintiff were able to persevere through the subsequent
litigation, she would have suffered a grueling, costly, and ultimately
meaningless ordeal merely because her state's courts regarded IIED
as a gap-filler.
The gap-filler doctrine represents the fullest expression of a
widely shared judicial skepticism toward IIED. This skepticism may
result from the tort's unusual origin as an essentially academic
creation, selectively crafted and even more selectively applied. The
fact remains that the courts have adopted § 46 and approved it as a
basis for liability in a broad range of factual scenarios. Yet there
seems to be little agreement as to the proper place for IIED in the law
64. This is not the only possibility. The court alternatively could decide the medical
malpractice case and make the IIED claim contingent on its outcome. However, by increasing the
duration and complexity of the litigation, even this alternative approach would run a high risk of
impairing the plaintiffs chances of recovery.
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of torts. The following sections identify several reasons for this
confusion in the overlap between IIED and various features of tort
theory, each of which presents potential pitfalls that courts may prefer
to avoid, and which collectively impede courts from following their
official recognition of IIED to its logical conclusion.
III. ANALYSIS: SEARCHING FOR THE LOST TORT OF OUTRAGE
The courts of all fifty states recognize IIED as a valid cause of
action and cite § 46 with approval, but they disagree about its status
as an independent tort. Those states that have relegated it to
secondary status have opened an exception to the general rule that
common law causes of action are independent, so their position
requires further explanation. While these courts on occasion have
found IIED to be a useful device for compensating the victims of
extreme antisocial behavior, they also demonstrate a strong
reluctance to allow these claims to proliferate. Their concerns may
rest on some special features of IIED that flow from its signature
injury, emotional distress-especially in that it is both uniquely
intangible and ubiquitous in society. These are essentially the same
reasons that led the original Restatement authors to find a judicial
consensus that emotional distress alone could not amount to a
cognizable predicate injury.
In the broader context of American tort law, the unusual
doctrine of "gap-filler IIED" creates troubling inconsistencies. These
inconsistencies are more than academic, as they undermine the
coherence of a system premised on the dispassionate application of
logic, principles, and values to human affairs, a system for which
doctrinal consistency is central to its legitimacy. The following
sections explore the justifiable concerns that underlie judicial efforts
to marginalize IIED either as a gap-filler or as an otherwise
disfavored claim, then examine some unresolved tensions between
IIED and other tort doctrines.
A. Why Courts Are Afraid of Outrage: the Problem of
Compensating Emotional Injuries
Why do some courts insist on the exceptional position that
IIED claims can never overlap with other claims? Perhaps some
judges oppose the proliferation of this emotion-based tort and
therefore seek to cabin its application as narrowly as possible.
Numerous opinions from various jurisdictions reiterate the position
that IIED is "disfavored," "given a narrow view," "treated as a limited
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cause of action," etc. 65 Disfavor is hardly an analytical term, but
instead connotes a visceral skepticism of IIED, a reluctance to allow
the claims into court. Such disdain may rest on any of several
justifiable concerns over the possible consequences of endorsing IIED.
Without pretending to be exhaustive, this section identifies and briefly
discusses seven such concerns: spurious claims; floodgates;
indulgence; vagueness; entrepreneurship in the plaintiffs' bar; erosion
of other torts; and pervasiveness.
Spurious Claims. Critics initially worried that a tort based on
invisible injuries to the soul or psyche would invite unprincipled
abuses in the form of falsified symptoms coupled with exaggerated
allegations of offensive conduct. 66 In an early opinion rejecting a (pre-
IIED) claim for emotional distress, the Kentucky Supreme Court
encapsulated this concern: "The damages sought to be recovered are
too remote and speculative. The injury is more sentimental than
substantial. Being easily simulated and hard to disprove, there is no
standard by which it can be justly, or even approximately,
compensated."67 The Restatement acknowledges courts' concern for
falsified or exaggerated injuries as justifying limitations on IIED
recovery. 68 This position recognizes that IIED provides an abnormally
fertile environment for litigious creativity.
Floodgates. Courts may worry that full recognition of IIED
would tap into a vast reservoir of antisocial behavior that normally
goes un-litigated but meets the standard articulated in § 46.69 Because
everyone faces emotional distress at some time or another, potentially
valid IIED claims seem to lurk in every emotionally charged human
encounter. 70 In contrast to the concern for spurious claims, there is the
65. See supra note 4.
66. See, e.g., Prosser, supra note 1, at 876-78 (addressing the intangibility of emotional
injuries).
67. Reed v. Ford, 112 S.W. 600, 601 (Ky. 1908); see also, e.g., Langeslag v. KYMN, Inc., 664
N.W.2d 860, 866 (Minn. 2003) ("To prevent fictitious and speculative claims we limit [IIED] 'to
cases involving particularly egregious facts.' " (quoting Hubbard v. United Press Int'l, 330
N.W.2d 428, 439 (Minn. 1983))).
68. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM 2
(Council Draft No. 6, 2006) (noting courts' historical concern that "emotional disturbance is less
objectively verifiable than physical harm and therefore easier to feign, exaggerate, or self-
deceive").
69. Prosser considered floodgates to be the "most valid objection to the protection of 'mental'
interests" and contrasted it with what he perceived to be the more readily avoidable problem of
"fictitious and fraudulent claims." Prosser, supra note 1, at 877-78.
70. The Restatement raises and addresses this concern frequently in its comments on
emotional distress. E.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND
EMOTIONAL HARM 6 (Council Draft No. 6, 2006) ("Because emotional harm often is
predictable... this tort could be too expansive."); id. ("A great deal of conduct may cause
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potential that even claims made in good faith would widen the range
of favorable IIED precedent and progressively lower the standards for
both the outrageousness and the degree of emotional distress
sufficient to maintain a claim. Therefore, some courts may fear that
liberal application of IIED would open a flood of arguably valid claims,
and they are compelled to preempt this deluge by enforcing rigid
limits.
Indulgence. There is a related concern that allowing
widespread recovery for emotional distress would send socially
deleterious signals and encourage the weaker side of human nature,
endorsing a thin-skinned response to the abrasive exchanges inherent
in interpersonal relations. 71 Like permissive parents who spoil their
children by kissing away every bump or bruise, the concern is that
courts would be "enabling"72 a decadent culture of complaint, blame,
and self-pity. Instead, like responsible parents who dispassionately
instruct their tearful, knee-scraped kids to "brush it off," courts that
limit IIED claims are sending the character-building message: "Life is
hard; deal with it."73 This "indulgence" concern overlaps with the
"floodgates" concern. Both rest on the idea that by allowing IIED
litigation to evolve to its logical conclusion, the result would be a
dramatic reformulation of the courts' role in the regulation of social
interaction.
74
emotional disturbance, but the requisite conduct for this claim is a very small slice of human
behavior .. "); id. at 12 ("[C]ourts are properly reluctant to adopt a potentially wide ranging
tort... without safeguards against abuse."); id. at 16 ("[Slome degree of emotional disturbance,
even significant disturbance, is part of the price of living in a complex and interactive society.").
71. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM 6
(Council Draft No. 6, 2006) ("[For courts] to give legal credence to and permit recovery for
emotional disturbance may increase its severity ....").
72. This term is meant in the sense that prevails in contemporary addiction literature-
essentially, this amounts to encouraging decadent behavior. See, e.g., Addiction Recovery Basics,
Codependency: Enabling Addiction, http://addictionrecoverybasics.com/2007/04/07/codependency-
enabling-addiction/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2008) ("Enabling behaviors are acts by those
surrounding the substance abuser which contribute towards the maintenance of the addictive
behavior.").
73. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM 2
(Council Draft No. 6, 2006) ("[S]ome minor or modest emotional harm is endemic in living in
society and individuals must learn to accept and cope with such harms."); Magruder, supra note
1, at 1035 (arguing that "[a]gainst a large part of the frictions and irritations and clashing of
temperaments incident to participation in a community life, a certain toughening of the mental
hide is a better protection than the law could ever be").
74. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965) ("The rough edges of our
society are still in need of a good deal of filing down, and in the meantime plaintiffs must
necessarily be expected and required to be hardened to a certain amount of rough language, and
to occasional acts that are definitely inconsiderate and unkind. There is no occasion for the law
to intervene in every case where some one's feelings are hurt.").
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Vagueness. As discussed in Part II, the "extreme and
outrageous conduct" element is remarkably ill defined. This vagueness
in itself may motivate courts to cabin potential IED liability.
Additionally, the lack of definition amounts to a lack of notice to
potential tortfeasors. Schoolyard bullies, romantic partners, drill
sergeants, Socratic law professors, and ultimately almost everyone
treats someone else cruelly, callously, or inconsiderately enough to
cause severe mental suffering. Whether this treatment subjects the
actor to liability for IIED might depend on whether someone in his
community, on hearing some version of the story, would be moved to
exclaim "Outrageous!"75 Courts may further mistrust their ability to
interpret and apply such a loose standard, especially in borderline
cases or when the parties each offer convincing but conflicting stories.
The concern over vagueness fixes upon the lack of effective notice and
potential arbitrariness of liability in light of the flexibility and
imprecision of the standard of conduct.
76
Entrepreneurship. The tort's lack of clear substantive
boundaries presents an open invitation to plaintiffs' attorneys to file
frivolous IED claims. As most cases turn on evidence of emotional
distress and the moral indignation of the fact-finder, the disposition of
borderline cases would be unpredictable. This uncertainty could
produce an escalating cycle wherein a certain class of defendants
would be motivated to settle to avoid expending time, money, and
reputation on a public trial, and plaintiffs' lawyers would find an
increasing incentive to continue seeking IIED clients77-potentially
leading to the birth of a cottage industry akin to ambulance-chasing.
Among other problems, such an IIED proliferation would contribute to
the common perception of plaintiffs' lawyers, the tort system, and
''runaway" juries as promoting absurd lawsuits and exorbitant
recoveries.
Erosion of Other Torts. Plaintiffs may use IED strategically to
avoid the obstacles to recovery under traditional torts that have
better-defined rules of liability and substantive protections for
75. Id. ("Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member
of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim,
'Outrageous!' ").
76. For a pertinent example, see Nickerson v. Hodges, supra notes 36, 49 and accompanying
text. It seems clear that the Nickerson defendants thought of their actions as a harmless
practical joke.
77. See Givelber, supra note 39, at 64-65 ("[Ihe plaintiffs claim has settlement value,




defendants.78 Defamation, in particular, would be at risk of significant
erosion if courts allowed plaintiffs to proceed with overlapping IIED
claims because defamation often results in emotional harms and often
can be cast as "outrageous. 79 This legitimate concern does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that IIED should be restricted
generally. To the contrary, it can be addressed through specific
provisions for the established substantive rules to apply when the
same issues are at stake.
Pervasiveness in Litigation. Finally, there is a concern that
IIED could become a routine filing, appended to any and all
litigation.80 In a regime of permissive joinder of parties, claims and
counterclaims, there is little structural restraint on such a practice.
Adversarial legal proceedings generally entail considerable emotional
distress for most litigants and often stem from disputes that were
uncomfortable long before they reached the courthouse, so it would
seem that the sole bulwark against an avalanche of vexatious claims
and counterclaims is the thin reed of "outrageousness."81 While the
concern over pervasiveness may appear to be reducible to a floodgates
problem, it potentially can encompass all of the problems that courts
might anticipate to flow from an undisciplined approach on IIED-in
addition, this concern arises from a peculiarity of contemporary
American civil procedure. Whether claims are spurious or legitimate,
permissive joinder creates an open avenue for all forms of
proliferation. Moreover, as a practical matter, the majority of IIED
78. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM 12
(Council Draft No. 6, 2006) ("Some emotional disturbance ordinarily accompanies most
unpleasant episodes. Thus, a claim for [IIED] can readily be added whenever the real gravamen
of the case is a different tort, such as invasion of privacy, malicious prosecution, defamation, or
employment discrimination. That open-textured quality, which makes [IIED] readily adaptable
to be asserted as a supplemental claim[,] has required more aggressive judicial policing of this
tort.").
79. See Chaiken v. VV Pub. Corp., 119 F.3d 1018, 1034 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that, under
New York law, plaintiffs "cannot avoid the obstacles involved in a defamation claim by simply
relabeling it as a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress").
80. See Givelber, supra note 39, at 64 ('"Modern procedure makes it a simple matter to add a
claim of outrageousness to a suit that would be brought in any event, or to interpose it as a
counterclaim if one has been sued.").
81. The Restatement addresses this concern through the provision that where an actor "has
done no more than to insist upon his legal rights in a permissible way, even though he is well
aware that such insistence is certain to cause emotional distress," conduct that "would otherwise
be extreme and outrageous, may be privileged under the circumstances." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. g. (1965). This would seem to encompass litigation generally as
privileged conduct. However, the comment does not state an absolute privilege and, most
importantly, it inexplicably presupposes that the conduct in question was "permissible" in the
first place, which would seem to nullify its effect when applied to any arguably "extreme and
outrageous" conduct between adversaries in litigation. Id.
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claims in fact are joined to other claims, so courts have reason to
perceive this as an issue.
It follows from these generally legitimate concerns that courts
are justified in taking a skeptical approach to IED claims and in
seeking methods to cabin their acceptance of the tort. Considering the
Pandora's Box of excesses that courts may anticipate if they allow
IIED claims to proliferate, the "gap-filler" doctrine provides one sturdy
nail to keep the lid on. However, it does not automatically follow that
courts should relegate the tort to secondary status as a "residual"
cause of action that can be maintained only when nothing else applies.
An alternative response to this entire suite of concerns is to
strengthen the doctrinal consistency of IIED.
The above-listed concerns share as an implicit assumption the
observation that emotional injuries are remarkably common, which
likely leads courts to fear that "too much" recognition of IIED claims
would encourage a flood of litigation in all the forms discussed. The
alternative proposed in Part IV addresses this general problem by
eliminating the focus on emotional injury and placing it instead on a
clearer articulation of the conduct that produces liability. Shifting the
judicial analysis in this way should enable courts to apply IED
consistently and conservatively without having to impose artificial
constraints.
B. The Predicate Injury Requirement for Recovery for
Emotional Distress
The landscape of recoverable emotional harms in American tort
law is an archipelago: irregularly shaped patches of solid ground with
miles of empty ocean in between. Certain torts allow for routine
recovery of emotional distress damages, framed variously as pain and
suffering, mental anguish, or loss of enjoyment of life. Emotional
damages are a typical component of personal injury judgments in
negligence and battery, and they predominate in assault and false
imprisonment cases. In such circumstances, the bar is set relatively
low: when the defendant is liable under any of these theories,
emotional damages are expected and awards often seem generous in
comparison to the suffering. These are the traditional cases in which
the emotional damages are "parasitic" on a cause of action that has an
accepted, non-psychological predicate injury.
Away from the established predicates, recovery for emotional
distress is rare. Even after the adoption of § 46, the Restatement still
provides a general rule that there is no liability for pure "emotional
distress, without resulting bodily harm or any other invasion of the
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[plaintiffs] interests."8 2 The only established doctrines that allow
emotional distress as a predicate injury are IIED and its "cousin,"
negligent infliction of emotional distress ("NIED"). However, unlike
IIED, NIED does not allow recovery of emotional distress damages;
instead, it allows recovery for any physical harm that results from a
negligently inflicted predicate emotional injury.8 3
A confusingly intermediate doctrine falls between negligence-
based NIED and the intentional tort of IIED. It is, essentially,
negligent IIED ("NIIED"), or IED without the outrage.8 4 Like NIED,
NIIED denies recovery for intentionally caused emotional distress, but
permits recovery for physical injuries that result from intentionally
caused emotional distress. The Restatement classifies NIIED as a
negligence theory because a liable defendant, by intentionally
distressing the plaintiff, would have been negligent for causing the
resultant bodily harm.8 5 As the Restatement notes, this cause of action
can overlap with both IED and NIED.8 6 In theory, once there is a
predicate injury of unrecoverable emotional distress that results in a
recoverable physical injury, any further emotional distress that
results from that physical injury should be recoverable as pain and
suffering damages of the type commonly awarded to victims of
negligence.
82. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A.
83. Id. § 313. A traditionally cited example is that of a defendant who negligently upsets a
pregnant woman and her distress results in miscarriage. In Mitchell v. Rochester Railway Co., a
plaintiff injured in this way was denied recovery because of the lack of any contact-which was
necessary for recovery under the doctrine of the time. 45 N.E. 354, 355 (N.Y. 1896). The
legitimacy of her claim seems obvious by contemporary mores. The Restatement addresses the
failure of the New York court by defining NIED proactively as a means to recover under similar
circumstances. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 313.
84. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 312 ("If the actor intentionally and
unreasonably subjects another to emotional distress which he should recognize as likely to result
in illness or other bodily harm, he is subject to liability to the other for an illness or other bodily
harm of which the distress is a legal cause, (a) although the actor has no intention of inflicting
such harm, and (b) irrespective of whether the act is directed against the other or a third
person."). The abbreviation NIIED is not standard-I coin it here both for the sake of efficiency
and to emphasize the apparent similarity of these three doctrines, with NIIED being the natural
hybrid of IIED and NIED.
85. The Restatement (Second) places § 312 within "Division 2: Negligence," under the
heading, 'Topic 6: Conduct Negligent Because Intended or Likely to Cause Physically Dangerous
Emotional Distress." Id.
86. Id. cmt. b ("There is a considerable degree of duplication between the rule stated in this
Section [§ 3121 and that stated in § 46 .... This Section permits the alternative of a negligence
action in [cases that are also actionable under § 46]. The rule stated here extends, however,
somewhat further than the rule of § 46. It permits the negligence action in any case where it may
be found that the conduct, although intended to inflict emotional distress, amounts to something
less than extreme outrage ....").
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Some courts have blurred the already indistinct lines that
separate these doctrines further by interpreting IIED liability as
requiring "medically significant" emotional injuries.8 7 The dual
purposes of emphasizing the necessary element of severe emotional
distress and filtering out spurious claims likely explain this
requirement. Nevertheless, the addition of this requirement
eliminates the practical distinction between IIED and its corollaries in
negligence because "medically significant" can be read as requiring
some form of bodily harm. Even when the medical opinion in question
is psychiatric, a case of complete nervous collapse requiring
hospitalization (i.e., such that it is "medically significant") would test
the boundary between mental and physical injury. That is, the
distinction between the two classes of injuries depends on where one
draws the line between mind and body, a line that medical science has
yet to draw. Thus, this interpretation of the severe injury requirement
renders the range of harms recoverable under IIED indistinguishable
from that recoverable under the negligent infliction doctrines.
The apparent unequal treatment of emotional distress that
results from an actionable physical injury as opposed to that which
results directly from conduct requires explanation. Professors John
Goldberg and Benjamin Zipursky present the example of two sets of
workers exposed to asbestos and fearing future cancer.88 One set of
workers showed no physical symptoms, while the others had been
diagnosed with benign mesothelioma.8 9 Although both groups had
suffered equivalent exposure and carried approximately the same
measurable risks of future cancer, courts were more likely to award
fear-based damages to those manifesting the benign condition. 90 The
authors observe that "[i]t is a mistake to suppose that, where there is
the same act and the same consequence, there must be the same
possibility of recovery."91 The question, which act and consequence
alone do not answer, is whether there has been an actionable tort. In
negligence, this entails that the breach of a duty has caused a
cognizable injury. The courts in the mesothelioma example concluded
87. E.g., Bogan v. Gen. Motors Corp., 437 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1045 (E.D. Mo. 2006) (stating
that under Missouri law, to support an IIED claim, plaintiffs "emotional distress or mental
injury must be medically diagnosable and must be of sufficient severity so as to be medically
significant") (citing Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765, 772 (Mo. 1983)).




91. Id. at 1675.
2008] 1007
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
that even a harmless physical manifestation of disease was cognizable,
whereas the purely emotional impact was not.
To remain consistent with American tort law's treatment of
recovery for emotional harms, the availability of an emotional-
distress-based cause of action, either IIED or NIED, depends on the
court's understanding of the plaintiffs legally protected interests and
the defendant's concomitant duties. Once the defendant is found to
have breached a duty or violated an interest, the threshold is crossed
and liability ensues for the resulting harm-as long as the harm is
compensable under the applicable doctrines. This is equally true of
both intentional and negligent torts. Thus, claims for personal injury,
assault, and false imprisonment trigger liability for emotional
distress, whereas claims for other injuries that can cause equivalent
or greater degrees of emotional distress typically do not trigger this
liability. As the Restatement articulates, there is no liability for "pure"
emotional distress injuries.92 Instead, IIED liability ensues once a
court finds that the defendant has violated the dignitary interest in
being free from extreme and outrageous behavior; it is the "injury" to
this interest (the "predicate injury") that enables recovery for the
emotional distress that results.
93
What distinguishes IIED from NIED or NIIED and all of these
from otherwise recoverable or unrecoverable emotional damages is
how we define the underlying violation. As argued in Part IV, the
doctrinal confusion surrounding IIED arises largely from its dual
focus on both injury and conduct. Confusion results because this dual
focus obscures the nature of the violation, sending courts on a
negligence-like inquiry into the severity of the emotional injury as a
threshold question. To the extent that the severity inquiry takes
precedence over the conduct inquiry, IIED becomes an anomaly in tort
law in that the emotional injury itself (or its severity) becomes the
predicate for its recovery. In contrast, IIED becomes a clearer doctrine
when treated as analogous to assault-in which the conduct alone
defines the violation and predicate for recovery, and the severity of the
harm it causes is relevant only to the calculation of damages. 94 This
92. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436(1) (1965).
93. See, e.g., Clark v. Estate of Rice, 653 N.W.2d 166, 169-70 (Iowa 2002) ("[Elmotional
distress can be a proper element of damages in a tort action ... when there has been an invasion
of some legally protected interest by way of willful and malicious conduct. In such instances,
emotional distress lies at the very core of the tort itself, and becomes an element of damages
because it arises from the violation of the legally protected interest itself." (internal citations
omitted)).
94. In assault, the conduct is defined partially in reference to the plaintiff. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 21 ("An actor is subject to liability to another for assault if (a) he acts
intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other or a third person,
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treatment, proposed in Section IV, has the benefit of maintaining
consistency with IIED's classification as an intentional tort and with
tort law's otherwise uniform approach to recovery for emotional
injuries.
C. The Right to Be Free from Extreme and Outrageous
Psychological Attack
The most significant judicial restriction of IIED is its
classification in some jurisdictions as a gap-filler, relegating it to the
status of a "pseudo-tort" that courts may freely disregard or accept as
they deem appropriate. This approach is at least unusual and possibly
unique in the field of tort law. Moreover, the gap-filler approach to
IIED is analytically problematic in at least two ways. First, in
recognizing a distinct cause of action, complete with a name and a
prima facie case, courts recognize the existence of both a protected
interest and a legal right to redress violations of the interest. When
courts qualify that right as enforceable only under rare and peculiar
scenarios, they deny protection of the underlying interest and, in
effect, deny the existence of a legal right recognized in their
jurisprudence. This denial raises a problem of internal consistency
between the courts' words and behavior. Second, compared to the
alternative approach of treating IIED as an independent tort, the gap-
filler theory has the unexpected result of creating gaps between IIED
and the other torts with which it potentially overlaps. When a court
rules out an overlapping IIED claim but the other, established tort
claim fails, the court has created a legal gap.
Section 870 of the Restatement provides an official gap-filler for
all intentional harms not captured under established torts under the
heading of "Liability for Intended Consequences." Also known as
"innominate tort" or "prima facie tort," § 870 imposes liability on
anyone who "intentionally causes injury to another ... if his conduct
is generally culpable."95 According to the commentary, the ALI
recognized that the common law governing intentional torts developed
as a disparate set of independent wrongs without a general unifying
or an imminent apprehension of such a contact, and (b) the other is thereby put in such imminent
apprehension." (emphasis added)). The distinction is that "imminent apprehension" of contact
does not amount to a tangible injury. Id. The prima facie case for assault does not require that
the plaintiff suffer fear or any other detrimental effect other than mere awareness of the
imminent contact. JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG, ANTHONY J. SEBOK & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, TORT
LAW: RESPONSIBILITIES AND REDRESS 562 (2004).
95. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870. Note that "injury" is broad enough to
encompass emotional harm; thus, in the absence of § 46 this section would capture at least some
IED cases.
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principle. 96 Section 870 "is intended to supply that unifying principle
and to explain the basis for the more recently created intentional torts
[such as IIED]. ' 97 Thus, all intentional torts, including the most
paradigmatic, like assault and battery, can be conceived as
"crystallizations" of this general principle. 98
As a cause of action, § 870 is expressly limited to "conduct
[that] does not come within a traditional category of tort liability."99
The true catchall of the Restatement, § 870 covers any situation where
one person intentionally harms another, but manages to do so outside
the orderly categories that predominate throughout most of tort law.
Thus, the section is devised to account for "incipient" torts-new ways
of causing harm that arise with the continuing evolution of society, or
injuries to interests only recently recognized as eligible for legal
protection. 10 0 Over time, if a particular doctrine were to emerge, the
next Restatement might define such wrongs, with specific elements,
among the recognized "nominate" torts. In effect, the tort of HIED
developed in this way-out of a common law tradition of granting
recovery to victims of acts that were generically tortious and caused
primarily psychological injuries. 10 1 For example, in the landmark case
96. Id. cmt. a.
97. Id.
98. Id. cmt. d. This is not to imply that prima facie tort is a well-developed doctrine with an
elaborate jurisprudential pedigree. In fact, invocations of § 870 in the reported case law are rare.
The Restatement identifies it as an afterthought to the development of tort law, although it may
be viewed more accurately as a forerunner-from the long gone time when "wrongs" were not
subject to precise substantive doctrines.
In the American system, one of Justice Holmes' opinions apparently initiated formal
recognition of a traditional generic tort. See Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 204 (1904) ("It
has been considered that prima facie, the intentional infliction of temporal damage is a cause of
action, which as a matter of substantive law, whatever may be the form of pleading, requires a
justification if the defendant is to escape ...."). Citing Holmes, the New York state courts
characterized the doctrine as "prima facie tort" and have applied it infrequently to atypical cases
of intentional harm since the 1940s. The first New York case to formally recognize the doctrine
was Opera on Tour v. Weber, 34 N.E.2d 349 (N.Y. 1941). It is ironic that New York is the leading
state on prima facie tort doctrine, as its courts also are the most resolute in asserting that IIED
must be no more than a gap-filler. These courts risk redundancy: with the availability of prima
facie tort, where is the gap that remains to be filled?
99. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 cmt. a.
100. Id. Prima facie tort also can encompass situations that would fall into exceptions to
traditional torts. For example, "the tort of false imprisonment requires the setting of boundaries
confining the plaintiff. It has been held that [prima facie tort] may permit recovery for
restraining a person from going into a place where he has a right to go." Id. cmt. j; see also Cullen
v. Dickenson, 144 N.W. 656 (S.D. 1913) (holding that prevention of entry from a public event
does not amount to false imprisonment but is actionable nonetheless). Thus, plaintiffs can
pursue instances of apparently tortious restraint that escape the rigid definition of false
imprisonment under a theory of prima facie tort.
101. Lord Bowen expressed the traditional view that "intentionally to do that which is
calculated in the ordinary course of events to damage, and which does, in fact, damage another
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of Nickerson v. Hodges, the court awarded damages for a woman's
mental deterioration and death evidently caused by a humiliating
practical joke. 10 2 The court cited no defined cause of action to permit
this recovery, but compensated the decedent's estate nevertheless.
10 3
At the time of its decision, Nickerson v. Hodges was the kind of
exceptional case that today would fall under § 870.
To the extent that courts treat IIED as a gap-filler, it is
effectively a subspecies of prima facie tort: a flexible liability doctrine
that is available for judicial emergencies and special circumstances.
These courts reserve IIED for circumstances where a victim has been
injured by an evidently culpable defendant and the injury is otherwise
uncompensable. This is the scenario that IIED describes: severe
emotional distress (a traditionally uncompensable injury) and a
defendant who has caused this injury intentionally through extreme
and outrageous conduct (conduct the court cannot bring itself to
excuse). The principal distinctions between IIED and prima facie tort
are that IIED is "nominate" and that the ALI, legal scholars, and the
courts of all U.S. jurisdictions have recognized a common law tradition
of providing recovery.
In recognizing any tort-ascribing liability to a category of
conduct and providing compensation for the harms it causes-courts
establish a legally protected interest. The Restatement goes further in
classifying the intentional torts, including IIED, as "invasions of
interests in personality," sometimes known as dignitary interests. 10 4
Just as the tort of battery establishes a protected interest in bodily
integrity,105 the tort of IIED establishes a protected interest in
psychological integrity.10 6 In both cases, the right to enforce the
interest is subject to various conditions, waivers, and privileges that
in that person's property or trade is actionable if done without just cause or excuse." Mogul S.S.
Co. v. McGregor Gow & Co., 23 Q.B.D. 598, 613 (1889).
102. 84 So. 37, 39 (La. 1920). For discussion of this case, see supra text accompanying note
36.
103. Id.
104. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS div. 1, ch. 2.
105. See id. § 18 cmt. c (noting that, in a battery action, "the essence of the plaintiffs
grievance consists in the offense to the dignity involved in the unpermitted and intentional
invasion of the inviolability of his person").
106. Published opinions that straightforwardly proclaim the recognition of this protected
interest are concededly difficult to find. In most cases, the recognition of such an interest would
be an implicit feature of the court's judgment taken in combination with generally accepted
theories of law. One case that makes it explicit is Huntingdon Life Sciences v. Stop Huntingdon
Animal Cruelty USA, 129 Cal. App. 4th 1228, 1259 (2005) ("Peace of mind is now recognized as a
legally protected interest, the intentional invasion of which is an independent wrong, giving rise
to liability without the necessity of showing the elements of any of the traditional torts." (citing 5
BERNARD E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, TORTS § 403 (9th ed. 1988))).
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may negate the right or otherwise render particular invasions of the
interest non-actionable. In the case of IIED, as defined by § 46, the
boundaries of the right and its underlying interest are peculiarly
vague, but despite this vagueness, when a state's court system
endorses § 46, it affirms the existence of a cause of action when this
interest is violated.
Thus, the view that IIED is at once a "named" intentional tort
(corresponding to an acknowledged dignitary interest) and a gap-filler
is difficult to reconcile. In taking the position that an accompanying
claim under another tort should negate a valid IIED claim, courts in
effect say: '"We recognize a person's right not to be attacked
psychologically-but only if the method of attack does not appear to
violate any other rights." An alternative, more sustainable
formulation is that the courts acknowledge both rights but, whenever
possible, prefer to redress simultaneous violations under the more
clearly defined doctrinal rules that govern most, if not all, other
established torts. In either case, the court assumes that protection
from psychological attack is subsumed under other rights-that the
interests the courts protect under the labels of defamation, assault,
battery, and false imprisonment incorporate the associated
psychological interests. To the extent that judicial vindication of an
assault victim also vindicates the right not to be attacked
psychologically by means of assault, this formulation may be a
defensible understanding of the relationship between IIED and
assault.
The problem with the gap-filler understanding is that the
vindication of one right by means of another occurs only when the
assailant's conduct actually fits within the definition of the other tort.
For example, if A threatens B repeatedly in a campaign of
intimidation calculated to make B a nervous wreck, and A succeeds,
but technically never creates "an imminent apprehension" of "harmful
or offensive contact," 10 7 then A may commit IIED without committing
assault. 08 In a gap-filler jurisdiction, the courts probably would
analyze A's conduct under the template of assault and conclude that B
has no legitimate claim under this theory and that IIED is unavailable
because threats are actionable only when they constitute assault. The
result is that any defect in B's assault claim effectively nullifies a
107. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 21.
108. That is, as long as the threats are severe and believable but the contact is never
precisely imminent-as the courts of A and B's jurisdiction interpret this requirement-the
conduct may fall within the ambit of the tort of assault, but imperfectly. At the same time, the
conduct may fit perfectly within the definition of IIED.
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legitimate IIED claim. While some courts may reason that this
scenario presents precisely the sort of gap that IIED should fill, many
courts instead would conclude that B merely has raised a defective
assault claim. The gap-filler theory of IIED can lead to either
conclusion, depending on a particular court's view of what constitutes
a gap in the applicability of other torts.
In recognizing IIED as a gap-filler tort, courts create an
interest that has gaps. The gaps arise at the outer limits of all
potentially overlapping torts, in any case in which another tort could
be claimed. In an effort to maintain a disciplined approach to the other
tort, these courts impose doctrinal confusion and inconsistency on
IIED: by creating a right that may be recognized or disregarded for
reasons unrelated to the underlying interest that it represents. Such
confusion is unnecessary and can be avoided simply by recognizing
that IIED is predicated on a distinct interest in not being attacked
psychologically. By the terms of § 46, only extreme and outrageous
violations of this interest will be vindicated. Because there is a
universal rule against duplicative recoveries, the theory of
independent IIED does not create any additional liability beyond that
created under "gap-filler IIED."109 Instead, it merely acknowledges
that § 46 creates a legally protected interest that coexists alongside
other distinct interests-and that courts decide upon the violation of
each interest as a separate question.
D. IIED as Outrage: A Punitive Tort?
In one of the few scholarly articles on IIED published since the
Restatement (Second) defined it, Professor Daniel Givelber observed
that the extreme and outrageous conduct element of § 46 dominates
the definition of the tort such that "there is no liability simply for the
intentional infliction of emotional distress." 110 Another way of saying
this is that IIED is not IIED--IIED is outrage. While this may be a
jarring observation (that somehow the bizarre notion of "outrage"
109. This is true even if some additional defendants are held liable under the independent
IIED theory. As argued in this section, a problem with the gap-filler theory is that it creates
inherent uncertainty about the boundaries of the gaps. However, neither theory of IED
categorically rules in or rules out particular conduct for liability that would be impermissible
under the other theory: the only categorical difference is that gap-filler courts would not hold a
defendant liable for both IIED and another tort for the same conduct.
110. Givelber, supra note 39, at 46.
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hijacked the modest protection of emotional tranquility), case law and
common sense support Professor Givelber's observation."1
Common sense dictates that, without something more, the
mere "intentional infliction of emotional distress"112 should not be
actionable. Conduct that intentionally distresses another is not only
common but arguably intrinsic to human interaction. Likewise, the
"emotional distress" cannot define the tort-as Prosser noted, if
recovery were based on hurt feelings alone, "we should all be in court
twice a week"113 As both the conduct and the injury are to some degree
mundane facts of daily life, the IED tort simply cannot exist without
strict limitations. The Restatement's primary limitation is to require
that actionable conduct be extreme and outrageous. Thus, with hurt
feelings and other emotional disturbance being so abundant, but
"outrageousness" being rare by definition, the natural focus of
inquiries under § 46 is outrage.
Outrageousness is the requirement that keeps run-of-the-mill
cases out of court and, not coincidentally, it is typically the primary
focus of judicial attention in reported cases. Courts facing similar facts
sometimes reach different conclusions as to what behavior qualifies as
outrageous 4-an inevitable by-product of the fact that outrage is
intrinsically subjective and that courts are presented with a large
volume of bad behavior. However, the basic guidance is clear: outrage
is extraordinarily bad behavior, limited to the most extreme cases.
Determining the application of IIED, then, is a question of gauging
community standards of "normal" versus excessive bad behavior.
The inevitable emphasis on outrageousness leads to yet
another problematic area of overlap between IED and the rest of tort
111. Mississippi is the only state whose highest court has announced the primacy of outrage
over injury expressly. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Devers, 405 So. 2d 898, 902 (Miss. 1981) ("Where
there is something about the defendant's conduct which evokes outrage or revulsion, done
intentionally ... it is the nature of the act itself-as opposed to the seriousness of the
consequences-which gives impetus to legal redress."). Nevertheless, review of large volumes of
IIED cases shows that, regardless of the jurisdiction in which they sit, courts' primary inquiry is
invariably into the outrageousness of the conduct. E.g., Breeden v. League Servs. Corp., 575 P.2d
1374, 1377 (Okla. 1978) ('The court, in the first instance, must determine whether the
defendant's conduct may reasonably be regarded so extreme and outrageous as to permit
recovery, or whether it is necessarily so." (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j)).
112. Here, the phrase "intentional infliction of emotional distress" is used for its literal
meaning alone-as distinct from the tort claim IED specified under § 46.
113. Prosser, supra note 1, at 877.
114. For example, in two very similar cases decided in different jurisdictions, ex-husbands'
claims of IED for the revelation that children they presumed to be their own biological offspring
were, in fact, the children of their wives' paramours have received opposite results. Compare
Bailey v. Searles.Bailey, 746 N.E.2d 1159 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (recovery), with Day v. Heller,
653 N.W.2d 475 (Neb. 2002) (no recovery).
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law: the standard for outrage bears a striking resemblance to the
standard of "egregiousness" or "reprehensibility" that qualifies a
defendant for punitive damages. The Restatement makes this
relationship explicit in defining punitive damages as applicable to
"conduct that is outrageous." 115 Some courts also have found IIED and
punitive damages to be duplicative, in effect holding that the same
criterion cannot lead to two independent recoveries. 116 The overlap in
standards has the apparent effect of rendering IIED redundant
whenever it coincides with another tort: if the other tort allows for
punitive damages, then IIED becomes unnecessary, whereas if the tort
does not allow for punitive damages, these courts may find that IIED
should be unavailable a fortiori. However, any such redundancy is
limited to scenarios in which the plaintiffs other cause of action: (a)
was winnable; (b) allowed for emotional damages; and (c) was one for
which punitive damages were not precluded or otherwise discouraged.
In all other cases, IIED has a unique role independent of punitive
damages, despite the noted congruence of their standards.
In light of the similarity between the standards for conduct
that creates IIED liability and conduct that earns punitive damages,
courts sometimes conclude that an IIED plaintiff is ineligible for
punitive damages. 117 These courts reason that it would be unfair for
the same modicum of misconduct that created the initial liability to
automatically subject the defendant to extra punishment. This move
reflects an understanding that punitive damages by definition should
be exceptional within any given category of tort. Courts can differ on
this point, and some have awarded punitive damages on top of IIED
awards, finding, in effect, that there is such a thing as "extra-bad"
outrageousness. 118
115. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2).
116. E.g., Westview Cemetery v. Blanchard, 216 S.E.2d 776, 780-81 (Ga. 1975) (observing
that the test "for a purely mental injury is essentially the same as the test for punitive damages,"
and holding, therefore, that awarding both forms of damages would be duplicative); Knierim v.
Izzo, 174 N.E.2d 157, 165 (Ill. 1961) (finding that the standard of outrageousness for IIED
renders the compensatory damages "sufficiently punitive" and therefore disallowing punitive
damages for any IIED claim under Illinois law).
117. See supra note 116.
118. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 415, 429 (2003)
(vacating an award of $145 million in punitive damages as excessive in relation to $1 million in
compensatory damages, and remanding for a moderate punitive damage award, although the
only significant compensatory damages were for IIED); Stockett v. Tolin, 791 F. Supp. 1536,
1560-61 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (awarding $1,055,001 in punitive damages where an unspecified portion
of the $308,284 in compensatory damages was awarded for an IIED claim; justifying the punitive
damages by the egregiousness, wantonness, and continuousness of defendant's outrageous
conduct; and citing similar cases in which courts of several states had sustained punitive
damages in addition to IIED claims); Henricksen v. State, 84 P.3d 38, 54 (Mont. 2004) (upholding
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Although the Restatement language quoted above appears to
support the view that IED is by its nature punitive, closer inspection
reveals distinctions both within the Restatement and in courts'
treatment of the two issues. Notwithstanding its reference to
outrageousness in defining punitive damages, 119 the Restatement
distinguishes the outrageousness that qualifies for recovery under §
46 as something beyond "the degree of aggravation which would
entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages for another tort."120 Without
such a distinction, IED would merge into punitive damages.
Punitive damages are, by definition, distinct from
compensatory damages in terms of both their theoretical justification
and the manner in which they are calculated. Whereas tort causes of
action impose liability for the harm caused to the plaintiff, punitive
damages are expressly intended to punish and deter the defendant.
121
A recent series of Supreme Court cases has clarified the methods of
calculation that state courts assessing punitive damages may employ
without violating defendants' substantive due process rights under the
U.S. Constitution. 122 A common theme at the "outer limits" of punitive
damages is the proportionality of the penalty to factors present in the
case: in particular, the reprehensibility of the conduct and the severity
or value of the plaintiffs injury must be proportionate. 123 IED
damages, however, are limited to the "value" of the plaintiffs injury.
both compensatory and punitive damages for IIED because their purposes are distinct); Coates v.
Wal-Mart Stores, 976 P.2d 999, 1003, 1009 (N.M. 1999) (affirming trial court's awards to two
plaintiffs of $30,000 and $15,000 in compensatory damages for their respective IIED claims,
$84,000 and $48,000 in other compensatory damages, and $1,200,000 and $555,000 in punitive
damages; articulating the standard of "extreme and outrageous" for IIED and a separate
standard of "malicious, willful, reckless, wanton, fraudulent, or... bad faith" misconduct for
punitive damages).
119. See supra text accompanying note 115.
120. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d.
121. See, e.g., Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Group, 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001) ("Although
compensatory damages and punitive damages are typically awarded at the same time by the
same decisionmaker, they serve distinct purposes. The former are intended to redress the
concrete loss that the plaintiff has suffered by reason of the defendant's wrongful conduct. The
latter, which have been described as 'quasi-criminal,' operate as 'private fines' intended to punish
the defendant and to deter future wrongdoing." (quoting Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499
U.S. 1, 19 (1991) (internal citations omitted))).
122. BMW of Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574-75 (1996) (announcing three "guideposts" for
courts to consider when reviewing potentially excessive punitive damage awards: "the degree of
reprehensibility ... ; the disparity between the harm or potential harm suffered by [the plaintiff]
and his punitive damages award; and the difference between this remedy and the civil penalties
authorized or imposed in comparable cases").
123. Id. at 575 ("[T]he most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages
award is the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct."); Campbell, 538 U.S. at 426
("[Clourts must ensure that the measure of punishment is both reasonable and proportionate to
the amount of harm to the plaintiff and to the general damages recovered.").
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In an IIED analysis, the court's reprehension is a threshold
determination for compensatory liability, whereas for punitive
damages, the court's reprehension is a multiplier.
124
With the respective analyses dissected in this way, the problem
of applying the same standard for both compensatory IIED liability
and punitive damages is diminished greatly, if not entirely. In both
situations, the court applies a moral judgment to the defendant's
conduct, but the questions are different: for an IIED claim, the
question is, "Did the defendant cross the line?" whereas for punitive
damages, the question is, "How far past the line did the defendant go?"
There is no requirement that these questions even refer to the same
"line." The mere fact that the two determinations can be summarized
in similar words does not make them interchangeable, and the
distinctness of their respective functions indicates that they should
not be treated as such.
Nevertheless, some observers have found overlap between IIED
and punitive damages and concluded that IIED therefore is either
superfluous or subject to limitation. If the two doctrines truly share
the same standard, IIED becomes a species of punitive damages that
courts may award whenever the otherwise unrecoverable emotional
injury is severe enough. The opinions of some courts indicate their
conclusion that this is precisely what IIED is or should be.
125
Following a similar line of reasoning, Professor Givelber
concluded that the IIED doctrine serves a valuable function for courts:
it compensates the victims of horrible behavior, unrestrained by
particular rules of application. 126 It is a handy judicial tool that is
always available for the occasional case in which the defendant's
conduct exceeds all reasonable bounds of decency, but would otherwise
escape censure. When a court decides that someone has "gone too far,"
it can invoke IIED to "achieve [situational] justice without the
costs ... of dissembling and distorted rules."'127 Givelber also doubted
that IIED "will ever provide the basis for principled adjudication."1 28
An alternative view is possible and, as argued in Part IV,
preferable to the unprincipled, ad hoc doctrine that Givelber
described. While Givelber may have been correct in discerning the
124. See, e.g., Henricksen v. State, 84 P.3d 38, 54 (Mont. 2004) (holding that Montana law
allows for both compensatory and punitive damages for an IIED claim-the former to
compensate for the harm to the plaintiff and the latter "to address the culpability of a
defendant's conduct").
125. See supra note 116.





predominance of outrage in defining the tort, his conclusion as to the
inherent subjectivity of its application remains questionable. The
quality of outrageousness is in the eye of the beholder, but TIED's
conduct element has another, more objective facet: the intent to inflict
emotional harm. The final part of this Note proposes that refinement
of the conduct element and elimination of the severe injury
requirement could provide courts with a consistent approach to TIED.
IV. SOLUTION: A NEW RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF OUTRAGE
TIED is a troubled tort. As discussed in the foregoing sections,
its problems of definition and inconsistent application arise from: its
questionable origins in common law; its hybrid nature under the
Restatement; and its analytical convergence with other areas of tort
law. 129 Moreover, TIED coincides with a wide variety of other tort
claims, especially assault, battery, and defamation. These overlaps
produce confusion over both the appropriate boundaries of TIED and
its status as either superfluous or a gap-filler.
This Note proposes reformulating TIED as a purely intentional
tort, the "tort of harassment," and eliminating its severe injury
requirement. In keeping with the Restatement's overall effort to
"restate" the law, this proposal does not radically reform the courts'
approaches to the cases they decide, but instead aims to improve
consistency of the doctrine's application. Thus, this suggested
alteration to TIED would maintain the same prohibition of "extreme
and outrageous conduct" and retain essentially the same lines of
exemplary cases that currently are covered under § 46. The tort of
harassment proposed here would not widen the existing net of TIED
liability, but instead would patch some of its holes.
A. Eliminating the Severe Injury Requirement
The proposal to remove severe injury as an element of the
prima facie case for TIED need not amount to a dramatic change in
either the definition or the practical application of the tort. To the
contrary, as an effort to achieve analytical rather than normative
reform, it would leave the essential determinants of liability
undisturbed. What the proposal would alter, and emphatically so, is
the necessity of an initial factual inquiry into the extent and severity
129. For discussions of IIED's convergence with recovery for pain and suffering, negligent
infliction of emotional distress, prima facie tort, and punitive damages, see supra Sections II.B-
D.
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of the plaintiffs actual emotional distress to establish the validity of
the claim. Doubtless, there are several possible ways to accomplish
this. The revision suggested here replaces the actual causation of the
harm with the concept of sufficiency to cause the harm, changing the
existing definition from:
One who by extreme and outrageous conduct
intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional
distress to another is subject to liability for such
emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other
results from it, for such bodily harm.130
to:
One whose extreme and outrageous conduct,
intentionally or recklessly, is sufficient to cause severe
emotional distress to another is subject to liability for
such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other
results from it, for such bodily harm.
131
Such a change does not disrupt the underlying substance of the
definition with respect to the types of conduct that create liability.
Under either version, the scope of liability is the same: the emotional
distress (and consequent bodily harm) actually caused by the
intentional outrageous conduct.
The change proposed here amounts to shifting the inquiry into
the plaintiffs injury from a subjective standard to an objective one.
Under the existing language, a court must investigate the plaintiffs
mind to determine whether the defendant's conduct was tortious,
whereas under the revised language, the investigation would not
require this degree of mental penetration. In the interest of doctrinal
consistency, the proposed change would reinforce the Restatement's
classification of IIED as an intentional tort. As is the case for the
"classic" intentional torts such as assault and battery, the factual
inquiry into the extent of the plaintiffs harm would inform the court's
judgment of the remedy, but not its initial finding of liability.
Section 46 already intimates such a revision through two of its
comments. Comment H describes the role of the court as "to
determine, in the first instance, whether the defendant's conduct may
130. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965) (italics indicate the portion to be revised).
131. The italicized portion contains all of the suggested revisions necessary to incorporate
sufficiency into the definition.
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reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit
recovery, or whether it is necessarily so."132 In the latter instance
(when "the defendant's conduct" is "necessarily" "so extreme and
outrageous as to permit recovery"), Comment H permits a court to find
outrageousness as a matter of law without assessing the plaintiffs
actual harm-just as in the revision proposed here. Although § 46
formally requires an additional finding of severe injury, the natural
implication of Comment H is that the extremity and outrageousness of
the defendant's conduct can amount to the sufficiency to cause
emotional distress. 133 Moreover, in guiding the court's inquiry into the
requisite severity of the plaintiffs injury, Comment J observes that "in
many cases the extreme and outrageous character of the defendant's
conduct is in itself important evidence that the distress has existed."
13 4
Thus, in defining the injury element, § 46 already suggests that a
court should look to the sufficiency of the defendant's conduct to cause
emotional distress and allows the court to determine that the conduct
was necessarily outrageous. In this sense, the revision proposed in this
Note does not conflict with § 46 as written, but instead incorporates
the clear implications of its comments directly into its primary
definition of IIED.
As discussed above, the bulk of IIED case law already has
gravitated to the conduct inquiry and away from the injury inquiry. 35
Removing the severe injury requirement from the prima facie case
would confirm and reinforce this natural trend. Nevertheless, it
remains common for courts to dismiss IIED claims on the basis that
the plaintiffs' injuries were not shown to be severe enough. 136 While
132. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. h (emphasis added).
133. The logic here is as follows: IED requires extreme and outrageous conduct that inflicts
emotional distress, id. § 46, so to say that conduct that was necessarily so extreme and
outrageous as to permit lIED liability is to say that it must have been extreme and outrageous to
a degree that would cause the requisite injury-that is, that the conduct was clearly sufficient to
cause the injury that gives rise to liability.
134. Id. § 46 cmt. j.
135. See discussion supra Section III.D.
136. E.g., Kalantar v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 402 F. Supp. 2d 130, 146 (D.D.C. 2005)
(holding that, in the absence of "objectively verifiable evidence" to corroborate them, allegations
of sleeplessness, stress-induced eczema, and other debilitating emotional responses were
insufficient to satisfy the "severe emotional distress" element of IIED, despite expert witness
psychiatrist's diagnosis of severe "posttraumtic stress syndrome"; also applying Virginia law's
"heavier evidentiary burden" standard for IIED). More typical examples of alleged emotional
injuries that fail the severe injury requirement are far less compelling than that in Kalantar and
often contain a hint or more of skepticism about the claims' veracity or severity. E.g., Bowling v.
Lawson, 122 F. Supp. 2d 693, 696 (S.D.W.V. 2000) ("[Plaintiff] fails ... to substantiate any claim
of emotional distress beyond his self-serving declarations just noted .... [His] statement that he
has been unable to do research and writing on Shakespearean plays due to worry is belied by the
quality of the research and writing he has undertaken as a pro se litigant in this case.").
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clearly in conflict with such decisions, the proposed revision would not
entirely reject their analysis-consistent with the guidance from
comments H and J quoted above, evidence of a severe injury still
would be relevant to the conduct inquiry.137 The nature of the question
would change slightly: courts still would be free to consider the
severity of plaintiffs' injuries as supporting the sufficiency of the
defendants' conduct to cause severe distress. This is analogous to the
well-established inquiry in an assault case wherein the court must
determine whether the defendants' conduct reasonably caused the
plaintiff to apprehend imminent harmful or offensive contact. As in
this Note's proposed revision of IIED, assault also lacks a severe
injury requirement, yet the impact of the defendant's conduct on the
plaintiff is central to the assessment of whether a reasonable person
in the plaintiffs situation would have apprehended imminent contact.
Under the proposed revision, courts should approach IIED
claims similarly to assault claims. The court can consider the
apparent extent of the plaintiffs distress as part of its sufficiency
analysis, but it is not required to do so. The court also is not required
to conclude that a lack of severe distress implies insufficiently
outrageous conduct, although this would be the natural inference in
most cases. Thus, courts that have dismissed claims based on
insufficient harm could continue to evaluate the same facts, but
dismissals would have to be based instead on the insufficiency of the
conduct.
If removing the severe injury requirement has so little practical
impact on the disposition of cases, then would this revision have any
significance? The severe injury requirement is central to the doctrinal
problems that plague IIED. The view of IIED as a gap-filler or
subordinate tort arises from the perception that it is an ad hoc device
created solely to compensate severe injuries that are not covered by
the "nominate" torts. 138 Such a view immediately becomes impossible
if severe injury is no longer required. As a matter of formal
consistency, IIED's classification as an intentional, dignitary tort
strongly implies (and perhaps entails) a proscription of conduct. The
additional requirement of severe injury undermines this logical
implication and thereby undermines legal recognition of the interest
in being free from the proscribed conduct. Moreover, the requisite
137. See supra text accompanying notes 132-134.
138. See, e.g., Montemayor v. Ortiz, 208 S.W.3d 627 (Tex. App. 2006) ("Intentional infliction
of emotional distress is, first and foremost, a 'gap-filler' tort, judicially created for the limited
purpose of allowing recovery in those rare instances in which a defendant intentionally inflicts




injury of emotional distress encompasses a class of harms that
naturally arise in any number of ways, blurring the distinction
between IIED and other torts causing the same harms. The proposed
revision eliminates each of these problems, but does so without
dramatic alteration of the scope of liability under IED as courts
currently apply it.
B. The Tort of Harassment
IIED's current definition, with its reference to outrage, has
been absorbed into the jurisprudence of all the states as well as the
federal system. This Note proposes that the familiar definition should
be retained in essence, but modified to focus judicial inquiry on the
defendant's conduct. As an extension of the proposed emphasis on
conduct, this Note proposes further clarification in the form of a more
precise caption: the tort of harassment. 139 The fact that IIED/outrage
already is known by two names both reveals and perpetuates the
schizophrenic nature of the tort: one name focuses on the injury, the
other on the standard by which courts assess the actor's conduct. The
foregoing sections describe problems that arise from emphasizing the
injury component-problems to which the name IIED, through its
reference to the injury, undoubtedly contributes. With respect to the
conduct, however, "outrage" is a remarkably deficient description, not
only in being antiquated and vague, but because it focuses attention
on the response of a hypothetical third party. 140
The matter of labeling may seem a cosmetic concern but, to the
contrary, the name attached to a legal claim can affect its social
impact. If people do not understand the basis for liability, they are
unlikely to respond to the law's normative message.14' Considered in
this context, changing the name to "harassment" has some likely
benefits. First, it is a more natural description of the conduct:
139. The British Parliament established its own tort of harassment in the Protection from
Harassment Act of 1997. NICHOLAS J. MCBRIDE & RODERICK BAGSHAW, TORT LAw 307 (2d ed.
2005). Like the proposal in this Note, it omits injury as a formal element, although it implies
that the conduct must cause distress. Id. The principal differences are that it sets a very low bar
of severity (merely "alarming" someone may be sufficient) and it requires at least two separate
instances to amount to a "course of conduct" sufficient to be considered harassment. Id. Still, in
its early years of judicial interpretation, the standard of conduct has been criticized as overly
inclusive and vague in comparison with § 46. Id. at 307-08.
140. As a syntactical proposition, A "commits" the tort of outrage against B when C thinks
that A's actions exceeded the bounds of acceptability. In so doing, A outraged C and therefore is
liable to B.
141. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021,
2050 ("For law to perform its expressive function well, it is important that law communicate
well.").
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compared to either "outrage" or "IIED," "harassment" articulates the
essential nature of the offense more clearly and leaves less room for
doubt as to the nature of the claim. Second, "to harass" is a direct
transitive verb, which clarifies the intentional nature of the tort: as an
action that A takes against or upon B.142 Third, if courts were to alter
their treatment of § 46 claims as discussed here-by either deleting
the severe injury requirement or elevating the tort's status as an
independent cause of action-the new name would help signal the
change.
Black's Law Dictionary defines harassment as "[w]ords,
conduct, or action ... that, being directed at a specific person...
causes substantial emotional distress.., and serves no legitimate
purpose."143 This is in itself a viable definition of IIED: with only
minor adjustments, it can apply to nearly every IIED case.
144
Renaming IIED as harassment would indicate the elimination of
severe injury as an element and thereby support the effort to impose
doctrinal consistency on this troubled patch of tort law. The name
harassment would recast the natural formulation and analysis of
claims in terms of a straightforward question: did the defendant
harass the plaintiff? With the question presented in these terms, it
would make little sense to condition the answer on the potential
availability of alternative remedies.1 45 Perhaps the most important
benefit of a change of names would be to highlight the significance of
naming a tort in the first place. It means that one incurs liability by
engaging in conduct that violates a protected interest, an interest with
a name. By extension, once a person has violated that named interest,
142. "A harassed B" (A did something to B) presents a logical basis for holding A liable to B,
especially compared to the grammatical mess discussed in supra note 140.
143. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 733 (8th ed. 2004) (emphasis added).
144. The primary exception would be IIED claims based on recklessness, a category into
which Rockhill v. Pollard (the callous physician case discussed in the text accompanying supra
note 63) would fit. There is active development in the case law on the question of reckless IIED,
much of which hinges on interpretation of the "directed at" language in § 46. Interestingly, the
Black's Law Dictionary definition of harassment also contains "directed at." While this Note does
not focus on recklessness, that standard also is consistent with the solution proposed here. In
fact, the archetypal scenario of sexual harassment, where a man propositions a woman in
inappropriate ways, is closer to recklessness than intentionality-typically, the causation of
emotional distress is not the principal motive for the conduct.
145. It still might make sense to say, for instance, that the availability of a defamation claim
limits the availability of a harassment claim, but this would be because the particular claim of
defamation would be held to subsume the potential harassment claim as a matter of substantive
law. What would not make sense is to say that the mere potential for any other relief answers
the harassment question, as in: "Did A harass B?" "No, because B should have complained about
something else instead." The alternative claim provides no answer to the question.
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the possible violation of other protected interests cannot negate the
original violation.
A potential objection to the name change is that it might seem
to extend IIED too broadly. 146 The term "harassment" as it is generally
used can apply to many situations expressly excluded from IIED
liability. For example, lawsuits between quarreling neighbors or
former business partners may be viewed as a form of harassment, but
as a matter of law they cannot support an IIED claim. 147 Likewise, a
great deal of regular behavior in romantic relations fits under the
common conception of harassment. It is fair to wonder whether the
new tort of harassment, no longer limited by the severe injury
requirement, might cast its net over any field of human relations in
which passions, grudges and bad behavior frequently occur. Such an
expansion could happen if courts were not mindful of the possibility,
but courts are inherently expert both in evaluating bad behavior and
in making distinctions. The record of judicial skepticism and restraint
in applying IIED, discussed earlier, demonstrates courts'
independence in this regard.
Critics may object that the new name would create confusion
with statutory prohibitions of workplace and sexual harassment.
Confusion might arise because the name is "already being used,"
because the concepts might blur together, or because a single fact
pattern might produce both tort and statutory claims under the same
name. 148 Some legal academics have proposed that courts should
permit the use of IIED claims to supplement existing Title VII
prohibitions of employment discrimination. 149 In her recent article on
this topic, Professor Martha Chamallas observes that workplace
harassment generally falls into the ambits of both civil rights and tort
law, but that many particular cases fit uncomfortably into the precise
146. The British tort of harassment clearly invites this criticism. See supra note 139.
147. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. g (1965) ("The actor is never liable...
where he has done no more than to insist upon his legal rights in a permissible way, even though
he is well aware that such insistence is certain to cause emotional distress.").
148. But see, e.g., Coates v. Wal-Mart Stores, 976 P.2d 999, 1004-06 (N.M. 1999) (affirming
lower courts' judgments that sexual harassment in the workplace can support a claim for IIED
regardless of potentially overlapping statutory schemes).
149. Regina Austin, Employer Abuse, Worker Resistance, and the Tort of Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1988); Martha Chamallas, Discrimination
and Outrage: The Migration from Civil Rights to Tort Law, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2115 (2007).
Title VII expressly allows for supplementary tort claims, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (2000); however,
state civil rights statutes vary widely in both their express terms and their construction in the
courts, with some preempting tort claims and others permitting overlap. See Chamallas, supra,
at 2120, 2137-38 (summarizing inter-jurisdictional disparities on the question of state civil rights
statutes' preemption of tort claims, ranging from total preemption in Iowa to judicially approved
blending of civil rights and tort claims in states such as New Jersey, Florida, and Colorado).
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terms or doctrines of either alternative. 150 She argues that the most
promising means of vindicating public policies against this class of
discrimination is for the courts to accept a broader application of IED
in the employment context. 151 Compared to statutory civil rights
protections, the IED tort is a relatively flexible doctrine that can be
adapted to address misconduct by employers that slips through the
cracks between the more rigidly defined statutory prohibitions.
15 2
Chamallas refers generically to "claims of harassment" as including
both civil rights and tort claims that arise from a hostile work
environment and are based on features of a person's identity, such as
race, sex, or subtler characteristics not presently recognized as
protected categories under civil rights law.
15 3
The potential problems of imprecision and inadvertent
misapplication that may accompany this flexibility are readily
resolvable, as courts are experienced in precise application of legal
theories, concepts, and terminology. One need look no further than
assault to find a parallel example: the tort of assault requires only the
apprehension of harmful or offensive contact, whereas criminal
assault is specifically "attempted battery" and (statutory) sexual
assault always requires physical contact. 54 As with the different
species of assault, there is room in the law for more than one type of
harassment. The respective legal authorities are discrete and unlikely
to be confused, and overlap between IIED and both workplace and
sexual harassment already exists in the case law.155
"Harassment" is a clear, simple predicate that captures the
essence of the wrongful conduct described in the phrase "intentional
infliction of emotional distress." With adequate stewardship, the
concept can encompass the same classes of behavior covered in the
IED case law and the various articles that have informed the tort's
development. Adopting this simple reformulation would promote a
more rigorous conceptual clarity as to what interest the tort protects
150. Chamallas, supra note 149, at 2139-51.
151. Id. at 2178-88.
152. Id. at 2139-51, 2177-80.
153. Id. at 2139-51 (discussing the potential for "locating" harassment claims in either civil
rights or tort law, and explaining why such claims do not fit perfectly into either field); id. at
2177-78 (identifying the potential of IED to protect against harassment based on characteristics
not protected under existing anti-discrimination law, such as "the effeminate man," "the African
American woman who wears corn rows," and other nuanced "bias directed at persons because of
how they perform their identity").
154. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 122-23 (8th ed. 2004).
155. E.g., Wilson v. Monarch Paper Co., 939 F.2d 1138 (5th Cir. 1991); Stockett v. Tolin, 791
F. Supp. 1536 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
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and what conduct it prohibits, which in turn should suppress the
judicial inclination to impose artificial restrictions.
V. CONCLUSION
The doctrine of IIED, as set forth in the Restatement and
applied in courts today, occupies an uncomfortable position in the
scheme of tort law, as it appears simultaneously redundant with some
established principles and inconsistent with others. Despite its
recognition as a legitimate cause of action in all U.S. jurisdictions,
IIED bears the stigma of official disfavor in the courts, which often
treat IIED claims with undisguised skepticism and hostility. The
doctrinal confusion and controversy surrounding IIED are traceable in
part to its peculiar evolution in the legal academy. In transforming
IIED from an occasional exception to the general rule against recovery
for purely emotional damages into a distinct cause of action, its
proponents sought to limit its effect by imposing stringent standards
on both the conduct and injury elements. The resulting definition of
IIED deviates from the intentional tort model by creating a dignitary
interest encumbered by an additional condition: the severity of the
injury. The problem with this chimerical creation is that it leads
courts to view IIED as something different from the traditional
intentional torts. By focusing attention on the principal feature of
IIED that is exceptional and controversial-the emotional injury-the
existing doctrine perpetuates its exceptional status and the
controversy surrounding it. As argued here, a minor alteration to the
prima facie case, eliminating the severe injury requirement, would
align IIED with other intentional torts. Defining IIED in this way-as
fundamentally a question of the conduct it proscribes-would remove
the justification for treating it as a disfavored exception and thereby
enable this area of tort law to develop naturally.
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